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I. INTRODUCTION
Human-induced climate change is a reality, even as we
endeavor to discern its particularities, and the pace and course of
its ultimate consequences.' It is a profound global problem that is
the subject of broad-based international treaties2 and the charge
of international scientific and political intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations.' Yet, while global warming will
have consequences that are shared by most members of the global
community, it will have diverse, local and quite specific implica-
tions for particular regions, nations and peoples.' Hence, as the
world grows warmer, we must also ponder how a changing climate
will affect various segments of the international community. This
includes assessing the degree to which nations and peoples have
or continue to contribute to the impending crisis, the wide-ranging
local and national capacities to react and respond and, for low and
middle income nations, how it coincides with their assessments
and plans for industrialization and modernization.
This is a complex query, for the victims of climate change are
1. For the Fourth Assessment Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change ("IPCC"), see SUSAN SOLOMON ET AL, WORKING GROUP I REPORT ON
THE PHIYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Kansri Boonpragob et al. eds., Cambridge University
Press 2007) [hereinafter IPCC WORKING GROUP I REPORT]; MARTIN PARRY ET AL.,
WORKING GROUP II REPORT ON IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILrITY (Wolfgang
Cramer & Daniel Murdiyarso eds., Cambridge University Press 2007) [hereinafter
IPCC WORKING GROUP 11 REPORT]; TERRY BARKER ET AL., WORKING GROUP III REPORT
ON MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Mukiri wa Githendu ed., Cambridge University
Press 2007) [hereinafter IPCC WORKING GROUP III REPORT]. All Fourth Assessment
Reports by the IPCC are available at http://www.ipcc.ch (follow Publications and Data
hyperlink; then follow Assessment Reports hyperlink).
2. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), available at http://unfccc.int/
notassigned/b/items/1417.php [hereinafter FCCC]; Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22
(entered into force Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://unfccc.int/noLassigned/b/i tems/
1417.php [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
3. The most prominent is the IPCC, a scientific intergovernmental organization
founded by the World Meteorological Organization ("WMO") and the United Nations
Environmental Programme ("UNEP"). IPCC, IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.cblorganizationlorganization.htm (last visited Oct.
11, 2009). The IPCC's role is to provide objective information about climate change,
assessing the latest scientific, technical and socio-economic literature produced
worldwide to gain an understanding of the hazard of human-induced climate change,
its observed and projected impacts and possibilities of adaptation and mitigation. Id.
The IPCC is open to all governments that are members of the WMO or the UNEP. Id.
4. IPCC, Summary for Policy Makers, in IPCC WORKING GROUP I REPORT, supra
note 1.
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not necessarily coterminous with its unwitting architects.' The
perpetrators of this crisis' are the peoples and nations of the
industrialized North whose carbon emissions are responsible for
most of the damage unfolding upon our fragile planet,' even as
large, rapidly industrializing nations race to join this unenviable
club.8 With respect to already industrialized nations, the objective
is to persuade them to undertake effective legal commitments that
will prevent, and hopefully reverse, further damage. Similarly, it
is hoped that developing nations will eventually follow suit and
reconcile saving our climate with their goal of rapid industrializa-
tion.' The effects of global warming will be asymmetrical even
among Northern Tier industrialized nations, although these
states will undoubtedly be better able to confront and adapt to
whatever consequences may unfold.'0 Those who will bear the
brunt of the most egregious effects of a warmer planet, are the
nations and peoples of the Global South. These small, impover-
ished and especially vulnerable nations are relatively powerless
5. See R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion, 6
CHI. J. INT'L L. 573 (2006).
6. For the author's views on the injustice of the causes versus the effects of global
warming, see generally Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations:
Further Reflections on Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559 (2007) [hereinafter
Climate Change and the Poorest Nations].
7. See, e.g., Barber B. Conable, Development and the Environment: A Global
Balance, 5 Am. U. J. INTVL L. & POL'v 235, 243-44 (1990); Alan Manne & Richard
Richels, The Berlin Mandate: the Costs of Meeting Post-2000 Targets and Timetables,
24 ENERGY POL'Y 205 (1996); Christine Moran Sinclair, Global Warming or Not: The
Global Climate is Changing and the United States Should Too, 28 GA. J. IN'L &
Comp. L. 555 (2000); Sammy Zahran et al., Ecological Development and Global
Climate Change: A Cross-National Study of Kyoto Protocol Ratification, 20 Soc. &
NATURAL RES. 37 (2007); Richard Schmalensee, The Lessons of Kyoto, 2002 MIT
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 96.
8. See, e.g., Zhou Dadi, Environmental Considerations in the Economic
Development of China, 9 ARiz. J. IN'L& Comp. L. 221 (1992); Steven Ferrey, Why
Electricity Matters, Developing Nations Matter, and Asia Matters Most of All, 15
N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 113, 146-49 (2007); Deborah E. Cooper, Note, The Kyoto Protocol
and China: Global Warming's Sleeping Giant, 11 GEO. INT'L EINvTL. L. REV. 401, 405
(1999); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Booming China Leads the World in Emissions of Carbon
Dioxide, a Study Finds, N.Y. TimEs, June 14, 2008, at AS.
9. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 905; Sinclair, supra note 7; Cooper, supra note 8; Dadi, supra note 8, at
225-28; Rosenthal, supra note 8.
10. For example, the Netherlands confronts catastrophe, while the United States
faces varying consequences due to its diverse geography. See, e.g., M.
VanKoningsveld et al., Living with Sea-Level Rise and Climate Change: A Case Study
of the Netherlands, 24 J. OF COASTAL RESEARCHi 367 (2008); Martin Beniston et al.,
Future Extreme Events in European Climate: an Exploration of Regional Climate
Model Projections, 81 CLIMATIC CHAN.GE 71 (2007).
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actors within this conundrum." Some, such as small island
nations and the indigenous nations of the Arctic region, may cease
to exist as their habitats disappear along with their cultures, civi-
lizations and entire way of life.'12 These nations also lack the
resources to deal with storms, rising sea levels, unpredictable
weather patterns and other impending calamities from climate
change.'13 Such effects will undoubtedly affect these nations' posi-
tions and development strategies, always their central focus in the
international sphere. Yet, despite their best efforts, these nations
have been unable to slow global warming or to play roles in the
solutions offered in its wake."4
Neither segment of the international community is the focus
of this paper, however. Instead, my intention is to explore one of
the nations at the midpoint of these two boundaries - Panama, a
middle income Central American nation that is a member of an
emergent and increasingly influential Second World. 15 With the
exception of China, and perhaps India,'" middle income nations
have not been a major focus of climate change studies, despite
their importance in halting the output of greenhouse gas ("GHG")
emissions and maintaining necessary sinks to capture the emis-
11. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1560.
12. See Dan McDougall, The World's First Environmental Refugees, THE
ECOLOGIST, Jan. 30, 2009, available at http://www.theecologist.org/investigations/
climate-change/269582/the..worlds..first environmental-refugees.html; see also
Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1573-75.
13. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1589-05.
14. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1600-05.
15. A variety of terms are used in this paper in an attempt to characterize and
differentiate between the varied groups of nations found in the international
community. The terms Third World, Southern Tier and Global South are employed to
distinguish low and middle income nations from high income industrialized,
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") nations, which
are characterized as the Global North, Northern Tier or simply industrialized. Third
World also designates the largely colored world of the Global South, as well as those
who formerly sought political autonomy during the Cold War from the warring
western First World and the communist Second World. Ruth Gordon, Katrina, Race,
Refugees, and Images of the Third World, in HunmicA1' KATRINA: AMERICA'S
UNNATuRAL DISASTER 226, 238-42 (Jeremy I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker eds.,
University of Nebraska Press 2009). Second World indicates the growing group of
middle-income nations that are not yet part of the OECD, but are also not at the
bottom of the international economic and political hierarchy. The complexities of
these terms are beyond the scope of this paper, as the emergence of this middle group,
largely populated by people of color is a work in progress. For further reflections on
such terms as developing, underdeveloped and Third World, see generally Ruth
Gordon, Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004). [hereinafter
Deconstructing Development].
16. See, e.g., Dadi, supra note 8, at 222-30; Rosenthal, supra note 8.
132
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sions being ejected."7
Like other middle income nations, Panama is not one of the
major sources of the processes that have led to a warmer climate,1
although it is seeking, and is well on the way to becoming a mod-
ern industrial state."9 Unlike poor nations which have been
marginalized within climate change discourse, impending indus-
trialization makes middle income nations significant in discus-
sions regarding the causes and responses to the mounting climate
catastrophe."0 Middle income nations possess varying capacities
to contribute to and deal with the problem, and are also able to
attract and assume climate change mitigation undertakings, such
as Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM") projects."1 Moreover,
as is the case with their poorer, more powerless neighbors, dealing
with climate change will undoubtedly affect their industrializa-
tion strategies and policies.
In some respects, Panama is typical of nations in the Central
American region. For example, it boasts rainforests, which as
sinks are crucial parts of the Earth's ecological mosaic combating
climate change. It also has indigenous populations that depend on
ecosystems threatened by a quickly warming climate, and face
17. See, e.g., Rogeio Gonzalez Garcia et al., Climate Change and Environmental
Policies in Mexico, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 217 (1992). However, many other
Second World nations have not been studied.
18. It is often noted that China is about to surpass the United States as the largest
emitter of global greenhouse gases. Rosenthal, supra note 8. Of course, China is also
the major manufacturing nation in the world, while the U.S. is a declining industrial
power that specializes in services as part of the post-industrial world. See
Vandenbergh, supra note 9, at 917-28.
19. See World Bank - Panama Country Brief, http://go.worldbank.org/
40JQNGAWOO (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (noting that Panama has experienced an
economic boom in recent years).
20. This author has explored the plight of nations on the periphery in some depth.
See, e.g., Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6.
21. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 12. The Clean Development
Mechanism ("CDM"), as defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows a country with an
emission reduction or emission limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, an
Annex B Party, to implement an emission reduction project in developing countries.
Id. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction ("CER") credits, each
equivalent to one ton of CO,, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.
MEINHARD DOELLE, FROM HOT AYR To ACTION? CLIMxA CHANGE, COMPLIANCE AND
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 30-33 (Thomson Carswell 2005)
(discussing projects involved with CRE trading); FCCC, Clean Development
Mechanism, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-.protocollmechanisms/cleaxn-development-
mechanismlitems/2718.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). There are a total of 1,108
CDMs worldwide; 714 (64.44%) are in Asia and the Pacific, 361 (32.56%) are in Latin
America and the Caribbean, 25 (2.26%) are in Africa, and 8 (.72%) are elsewhere.
FCCC, CDM Registration, http://cdm.unfccc.int./Statistics/Registration/RegisteredProj
ByRegionPieChart.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
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projects intended to combat global warming that may destroy both
their lands and way of life."2 Indeed, these communities may be
forced to "develop" in a manner that was neither contemplated nor
desired."3 Thus, Panama represents the customary case, to the
extent we can speak of customary cases," of a nation somewhere
in the range of intermediate states within climate change
deliberations.
Then again, perhaps on some level, there are no customary
cases in climate change discourse, as geography and capacity
unquestionably influence the level of potential injury. Panama's
location and geography have profoundly influenced its politics,
economy and history, possibly making Panama, by some mea-
sures, one of the most atypical nations in the world.2 " Located on
the isthmus that connects the North and South American conti-
nents and, at its narrowest point separating the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans by only fifty miles, it is where the United States
eventually decided to construct the Panama Canal.2 " Completed
in 1914, the process leading to this achievement reeked of coloni-
alism, racism and domination;" indeed, the canal was central to
Panama's "liberation" and resulted in a broad swath of its terri-
tory essentially under U.S. control for almost 100 years .28 Still,
the Panama Canal and its surrounding ecosystem, taken together,
is a technological and ecological wonder of the modern world.2 " At
the turn of the twenty-first century, the Panama Canal became a
Panamanian possession, fundamental to its economy and plans to
step boldly into the industrialized world.30 In this quest, the
22. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
24. Since each nation can be differentiated by size, location, geography and
capacity, there may be no such thing as a customary case.
25. Of course each nation is unique, given the many cultures, ethnicities and
economies found across the international spectrum and that each particular piece of
land is distinctive and thus possesses its own particular geography and climate.
When these factors are added together, the distinctiveness of each nation is apparent.
26. Panama - Britannica Online Encyclopedia (2009), http://www.britannica.com/
eb/article-41028 (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
27. See infra notes 245-71 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 257-80 and accompanying text.
29. The Canal Zone has a complex ecosystem that not only facilitates shipping
through the Canal, but supplies drinking water to the nearby cities of Panama and
Colon. Jennifer L. O'Hara, Introduction: The Panama Canal Watershed Area, in
PROTECTING WATERSHED AREs: CASE OF THE PANAMA CANAL. 1 (Mark Ashton et al.
eds., Food Products Press 1999). It takes 1.8 billion gallons of water a day to facilitate
passage through the gravity fed locks. Id. at 2.
30. For a thorough history of the Panama Canal, see generally Panama Canal
Authority Technical Resources Center and Corporate Communications Division, A
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Canal is being expanded, at great expense, to facilitate larger and
additional ships .3 ' But climate change may alter this strategy, for
the prospect of Arctic melting presents the reality of an alterna-
tive route between the Atlantic and Pacific .3 ' Thus, a course of
action meant to generate significant additional revenues to Pan-
ama may instead be less productive due to a changing climate.
This essay will use Panama as a prototype to explore how a
small, growing, and rather distinctive nation will face what may
be the greatest ever challenge to mankind. Some of the challenges
are more typical, such as the impact of CDM projects on indige-
nous and other communities, and how middle income nations
might approach dealing with quickly shifting land and water-
based ecosystems. Still, each nation is different and will face its
own set of unique problems and challenges. For Panama, it is the
Panama Canal, a central part of its economic edifice that will be
profoundly affected by a changing climate. This paper will con-
template how a rapidly changing climate may directly, and per-
haps indirectly, undercut the approaches and perspectives of
various communities, as well as Panama as a whole, regarding
their hopes, potential and prospects for joining the industrialized
world.
The discussion will proceed as follows. Part I will briefly
explain climate change and its possible and probable ecological
consequences, beginning with a very brief explanation of the
underlying scientific causes. It will then explore both the current
and future effects of this process, with an emphasis on the Global
South and more specifically, South and Central America.3 " Part II
History of the Panama Canal: French and American Efforts (2001), available at http:II
www.pancanal.com/eng/history/index.html [hereinafter History of Canal].
3 1. See PANAMA CANAL1 AUTHORITY, PROPOSAL FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE PANAMA
CANAL.: THIRD SET OF LOCKcS PROJECT 34-41 (2006), available at http://
www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/ (follow Panama Canal Expansion Proposal - Third
Locks Project hyperlink).
32. A record breaking ice melt during the summer of 2007 opened up the
Northwest Passage. John Roach, Arctic Melt Opens Northwest Passage, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/2007/09/070917-northwest-passage.html. Arctic summers could become
completely ice free by 2030, which would open up both the Northwest and Northeast
Passages. See generally Marcel De Armas & Maria Vanko, Mitigating Black Carbon
as a Mechanism to Protect the Arctic and Prevent Abrupt Climate Change, 8
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 41 (2008). Accordingly, there is a new desire to expand
icebreaker fleets. Andrew C. Revkin, Experts Urge U.S. to Increase Icebreaker Fleet in
Arctic Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2008, at A6. Climate change could alter the entire
shape of globalization. See, e.g., Timothy Aeppel, Stung by Soaring Transport Costs,
Factories Bring Jobs Home Again, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2008, at Al.
33. See RICHARD S. ODINGO, THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN AFRICA: A
5
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will briefly explore the international legal response, including the
various perspectives of high, middle and low income nations, and
instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol's CDM, specifically
directed at Southern Tier middle income industrializing nations,
such as Panama. Part III turns to Panama and its place within
the Southern Tier .34 It begins with a general introduction to Pan-
ama's political and economic history, before turning to its climate,
ecology and natural resources. It will then discuss the current
and projected effects of climate change and Panama's role in the
legal labyrinth established to address the problem. As an indus-
trializing tropical nation with indigenous populations, Panama is
a microcosm of the challenges faced by similarly situated nations
and may demonstrate potential difficulties and solutions. Part IV
focuses on what makes Panama extraordinarily distinctive: the
Panama Canal.3 This section will begin with a short history of
the canal and will then discuss the ongoing expansion project and
the rationale and expectations of Panamanians for this undertak-
ing. Part V turns to the implications of climate change for the
Panama Canal system, including the extent to which a warming
Arctic Ocean may present a competing route to Canal traffic.3
Such an outcome may have severe consequences for Panama and
its people, as they embark upon a hugely expensive modernization
project. Finally, Part VI will provide conclusions regarding the
impact of climate change on a small, booming, middle income
nation whose future, at least according to the World Bank, is
bright despite broad economic disparities within its population.3
It may be that the forces of industrialization that are responsible
for climate change, will ultimately lead to industrializing coun-
tries having less control over their destinies as they attempt to
pursue this path.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE: CAUSES & EFFECTS
A. Causes
Global warming is a distortion of the quite natural phenome-
FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (Climate
Network Africa, 2001); Steffen Kallbekken & Hege Westskog, Should Developing
Countries Take on Binding Commitments in a Climate Agreement? An Assessment of
Gains and Uncertainty, 26 THE ENERGY J. 41, 48 (2005); infra notes 52-112 and
accompanying text.
34. Infra notes 182-242 and accompanying text.
35. Infra notes 243-97 and accompanying text.
36. Infra notes 298-326 and accompanying text.
37. Panama Country Brief, supra note 19; infra Part VI.
136
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non that keeps our planet at average temperatures and supports
the flora and fauna inhabiting its multifarious enion. A bas -
ket of gases 39 maintain the equilibrium between incoming solar
and outgoing terrestrial radiation. Known as greenhouse gases
("GHGs") because they operate much as a greenhouse, these gases
prevent infrared radiation from escaping the Earth's atmosphere.
This trapped heat warms our planet and keeps it at a sustainable
and comfortable temperature."0 Scientists have long theorized,4
and ice core studies in Greenland and Antarctica have confirmed,
a link relating the regular and natural oscillations between colder
and warmer global climate epochs with varying concentrations of
GHGs .4 1 Despite normal climatic variations throughout history,
industrialization has now given rise to record levels of GHG emis-
sions, which in turn has magnified the normal greenhouse effect
38. Why Electricity Matters, supra note 8, at 114-23.
39. There are approximately thirty trace greenhouse gases ("GHGs"), the most
important being C02, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons ("HFCs") and
chlorofluorocarbons ("CF~s"). Tim FLANNERY, THE WEATHER MAKERS: How MAN is
CHANGING THE CLIMATE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR LIFE ON EARTH 30-31 (Atlantic
Monthly Press 2006). Methane is the second most important GHG, after CO2; it
flourishes in swamps, farts and belches and is estimated to have brought about 15-
17% of the global warming this century. Id. Nitrous Oxide (laughing gas) is derived
from burning fossil fuels and biomass and from fertilizers that contain nitrogen. Id.
The HFC and CFC family of chemicals are the only GHGs that are manmade. Id.; see
also J.R. SAND, S.K. FISCHER & V.D. BAXTER, ENERGY AND GLOBAL WARMING IMPACTS
OF HFC REFRIGERANTS AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: TEWI-IlI (June 12, 1997),
available at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/Product.biblio.jsp?query-id=0&page=0&osti_
id=489696. These chemicals are also responsible for ozone depletion and have been
phased out under international instruments addressing ozone depletion. See, e.g.,
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513
U.N.T.S. 293; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987 S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10 (1988), 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol].
40. Without GHGs the earth would be uninhabitable, as average temperatures
would drop from the current 601F to 5' F. DOELLE, supra note 21; Clare Breidenich,
Daniel Magraw, Anne Rowley & James W. Rubin, The Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 Am. J. INT'L L. 315, 316 n.7
(1998).
41. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1565-70.
42. Glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica contain geophysical records of
atmospheric and oceanic changes and glacial ice cores record the rise and fall of
temperature changes during alternating ice ages and interglacial period. F.
Sherwood Rowland, Atmospheric Changes Caused By Human Activities: From Science
To Regulation, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1261, 1285 (2001) ("During the last million years, the
Earth has passed through a series of very cold spells (the Ice Ages) interspersed with
warmer, interglacial periods . . . ."). Scientists now understand the relationship
between GHGs and their crucial effect on the ability of earth to emit the radiation
that keeps temperatures at a certain level. Id. at 1281.
138 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2
to such an extent that it is causing alterations to our climate.4
What is currently occurring is neither ordinary nor natural - it is
most definitely human made.'
A by-product of industrialization, climate change is caused
mostly by the industrialized nations of the North" that spew
emissions from carbon-based energy sources fueling factories,
businesses, homes, technology, machinery and transportation: the
foundation of modern societies .46 Furthermore, the emissions of a
rapidly industrializing Second World are swiftly escalating as
industrial production shifts to Second and Third World countries
and as middle income nations, some with huge populations, mimic
the consumption patterns of the industrialized North .47 As these
nations attempt to become full-fledged members of the industrial-
ized world with respect to standards of living, they also duplicate
43. E.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and
Climate Change 41-44 (Bloomsbury Publishing 2006); Ryokichi Hirono & Heike
Schroder, The Road to and from Kyoto Protocol: The Perspectives of Germany and
Japan, 5 INT'L REV. FOR ENVTL. STRATEGIEs 39, 41 (2004) (noting that global
temperatures and CO 2 levels have increased more rapidly recently than any other
time in the last 10,000 years with CO2 level, by parts per million or 'ppm," increasing
from 285 in the mid-nineteenth century to 365 today). CO2 levels are predicted to rise
as high as 760 ppm by mid century, with a corresponding projected rise in surface
temperatures. Press Release, Ken Caldeira, C02 Emissions Could Violate EPA
Ocean-Quality Standards Within Decades (Sept. 19, 2007), http:fl
www.eurekalert.org/pub.releases/2007-09/ci-cec09l907.php (last visited Nov. 11,
2009). The consequences of such a steep rise in the average global temperature are
potentially catastrophic. See generally Elizabeth Kolbert, The Darkening Sea: What
Carbon Emissions are Doing to the Ocean, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 2006, at 66-75.
Indeed, the last time CO2 concentrations were at this level was during the Eocene
period, when sea levels were believed to be almost three hundred feet higher than in
modern times. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man-Ill, THiE NEW YORKER, May 9,
2005, at 52.
44. FCCC, Feeling the Heat: Introduction, http://unfccc.int/essential-background/
feeling-the.heatitems/2917.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (discussing major causes
and subsequent effects of climate change).
45. Generally considered the "Annex I Parties" of the Kyoto Protocol, this
grouping includes OECD countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada,
Australia, Japan, and to a lesser extent, former Soviet bloc nations, which were
previously known as the Second World. FCCC, Parties & Observers, http://unfccc.intl
parties anc~observers/items/2704.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2009); Jayati Ghosh, The
Global North-South Carbon Divide, THE GuARDIAN, Oct. 1, 2009, http:ll
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/oct/Ol/climate-change-debate-
copenhagen.
46. Leah H. Martinez, Post Industrial Revolution Human Activity and Climate
Change: Why the United States Must Implement Mandatory Limits on Industrial
Greenhouse Gas Emmissions [sic], 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 403, 404-06 (2005).
47. For an analysis of the Second World's emerging status in the international
community, see generally PARAG KHLANNA, THE SECOsN WORLD: EMPIRES AN])
INFLUENCES IN THlE NEW GLOBAL ORDER (Random House 2008).
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the North's GHG emissions, especially as they become the facto-
ries for the goods that feed Western consumption." Oddly enough,
we often cheer this momentum and generally view it as progress;"9
indeed, within the development paradigm it is progress." The
problem is this paradigm is plunging headlong into an increas-
ingly stressed environment that is making "progress" unsustain-
able. In ecological terms, the current Western lifestyle, even as it
begins to evolve, is ultimately and profoundly unsustainable."'
B. Effects: Current and Predicted
1. The Damage Thus Far
Although the climate is warming as a result of Northern lifes-
tyles, the transformation underway will have a disproportionate
effect on the nations and peoples of the Third World because of
geography and limited resources to adapt to and face the chal-
lenges of a quickly warming climate."2 The consequences of global
warming are evolving and unfolding, even as the international
community continues to vacillate; nonetheless, thus far, the fol-
lowing realities have been observed." Earth's average surface
temperature increased over the twentieth century, and the 1990s
was the warmest decade of the century.5 4 Average sea levels
climbed and the heat content of the world's oceans rose; warmer
oceans increase the quantity of atmospheric water vapor, which in
48. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1600-05. These
nations make a firm distinction between their survival emissions and the luxury
carbon emissions of OECD nations. Id.
49. This author is always struck by cheerleading within the U.S. media as people
in China, India or other countries begin buying cars or otherwise imitating the
wasteful polluting lifestyle that currently characterizes our culture. See, e.g.,
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Fast Food Hits Mediterranean; a Diet Succumbs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2008, at Al.
50. The author has previously explored ideas of progress and development in some
depth. See Deconstructing Development, supra note 15.
51. Western lifestyles are probably unsustainable when practiced by the small
group of high income nations. Current burgeoning environmental catastrophes, such
as climate change demonstrate this. When extended to the entire global population
the Western lifestyle is most definitely unsustainable and may prove to be so even in
its newer, greener permutations. However, sustainable development discourse has
focused on poor nations with only a few nods to the wasteful, polluting and ultimately
unsustainable lifestyles of the industrialized West. For a more extended discussion of
this disconnect and related issues, see Ruth Gordon, Unsustainable Development
(forthcoming).
52. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1560.
53. For the latest IPCC Assessment Reports, see supra note 1.
54. Rob Gutro, Earth Gets a Warm Feeling All Over, NASA, Feb. 8, 2005, http://
www.nasa.gov/visionearth/ookingatearth/earth-warm.html.
9
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turn increases precipitation, an effect already being observed
along with increases in average cloud cover.55 Warmer oceans also
trigger more intense storms and hurricanes. Ecosystems are
under stress, as animal migratory patterns shift, and both fauna
and flora attempt to adapt to a swiftly changing climate." As the
freeze line shifts northward, the Arctic is dramatically changing.
Snow cover is decreasing as is Arctic ice,5" and other areas outside
the Arctic region are experiencing shorter periods of lake and
river ice cover.5" Glaciers are melting at an unprecedented rate in
both the Arctic and Antarctica," as ar monain snowcaps. In
the twentieth century, there was a widespread retreat of moun-
tain glaciers in non-polar regions."1 More alarmingly, the Green-
land ice sheet, which climate scientists consider one of the most
important barometers of climate change, is disappearing at a
faster rate than had previously been anticipated." This disap-
pearance may have already reached a point of terminal decline .63
Indeed, the polar regions, and especially the Arctic, have been
55. A. E. Dessler, Z. Zhang & P. Yang, Water-Vapor Climate Feedback Inferred
from Climate Fluctuations, 2003-2008, 35 GEOPI-wSICALRESEARCH LETTERS, available
at http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2008/2008GL035333.shtm.
56. BRENDA EKWURZEL & SUSAN JOY HASSOL, FINDIrNGS OF THE IPCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS (2007), available at http:ll
www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/science/findings-of-the-ipcc-
fourth.html.
57. Elizabeth Kolbert, Chilling, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 20, 2006. A recent study
has shown that many species have shifted their migratory range northward by about
3.8 miles per decade. John Esterbrook, Global Warming Kicks Off A Migration:
Studies: Many Plants and Animals are Moving Northward, CBS NEWS, Jan. 2, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/02/tech/main534993.shtml; see also Andrew
C. Revkin, Warming is Found to Disrupt Species, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003, at Al.
58. Changes in Ice: The 2007 IPCC Assessment, Testimony Before the H. Comm. on
Science (Feb. 8, 2007) (testimony of Dr. Richard V. Alley).
59. For the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's ("NOAA") latest
Arctic Report Card on the sea ice cover, see D. Perovich et al., Sea Ice Cover, http:l
www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/seaice.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
60. Id.; Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice Extent
Remains Low; 2009 Sees Third-Lowest Mark (Oct. 6, 2009), http://nsidc.org/news/
press/2009l005_minimumpr.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
61. See D. Perovich et al., supra note 59.
62. Greenland lost an annual average of 195 km3 of ice per year from 2003 to 2008,
which can produce an annual rise in the global sea level of five centimeters over the
next century. Delft University of Technology, An Accurate Picture of Ice Loss in
Greenland, SCIENCE DAILY, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/
09/080930081355.htm. The summer of 2007 was particularly warm with over 350 M3
of ice melted in only two months. Id.
63. See Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a
Warmer World, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61, 74-75 nn.70-74 (2004) (citing to scientific articles
describing the unbalance of the Greenland ice shelf); see also Louise Huffman, Arctic
Sea Ice Will Probably Not Recover, INTERNATIONAL PoLAR YEAR 2007-2008, Feb.19,
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deteriorating so dramatically that there is genuine concern that
the Earth's climate is changing more rapidly than current scien-
tific models predicted.64 Indeed, some native communities near
the poles are being readied for removal as their habitats
deteriorate.
2. Potential Future Consequences
Our planet has reached a tipping point towards a warmer cli-
mate, regardless of any ameliorating actions mankind might
undertake. At this juncture, we can only blunt the consequences
of global warming by taking prompt action .66 The future is uncer-
tain and will depend on measures undertaken by a thus far reluc-
tant international community. 67 Nonetheless, climatologists
predict that climate change will have varying and uneven conse-
quences, many detrimental and some potentially catastrophic."8
Generally, we can expect more of the previously noted outcomes,
only at a more rapid pace and with increasingly onerous results.
The deterioration of the polar regions is expected to acceler-
ate, as is the related problem of rising ocean levels.6 " Heat waves
2008, http://www.ipy.org/index.php?option=com-k2&id=2 130:arctic-sea-ice-will-
probably-not-recover&view=item&Itemid=9.
64. See Huffman, supra note 63 (expressing concern that Arctic ice will disappear
completely much sooner than previously estimated); De Armas & Vanko, supra note
32, at 41 (noting that Arctic ice was at a record low in 2007, 39% lower than the long
term average from 1979 to 2000).
65. Jonathan Shaw, The Great Global Experiment, HARVARD MAG., Nov.-Dec.
2002, at 3.
66. See Steven Ferrey, Gate Keeping Global Warming: The International Role of
Environmental Assessments and Regulation in Controlling Choices for Future Power
Development, 19 FoRDUAM EI~vTm. L. REv. 101, 104 (2009) (noting that severe damage
to the planet has already occurred and cannot be reversed).
67. The IPCC has carefully and cautiously attempted to estimate the likely effects
of global warming, indeed some would say too cautiously. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The
Climate of Man - I, THE NEW YORKEaR, Apr. 25, 2005, at 56, available at http:ll
www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/04/25/050425fa-fact3. This task is exceedingly
complex as scientists attempt to determine likely temperature changes, and then
what changes will flow from these variants. Id. Moreover, there are feedback loops
that may influence the rate of warming and other effects, such as the level of oceanic
expansion. Finally, the impact will also vary depending on the extent and timing of
curbs on global emissions. Summary for Policymakers, supra note 4, at 12.
68. The IPCC defines "adverse effects of climate change" as "changes in the
physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant
deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and
managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human
health and welfare." FOOC art. 1, § 1.
69. Thawing permafrost, shrinking snow cover and dwindling sea ice is expected
in both the Arctic and Antarctic. E.g., Edward A.G. Shuur et al., Vulnerability of
Permafrost Carbon to Climate Change: Implications for Global Carbon Cycle, 58
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are highly probable, with predictably negative effects on humans,
fauna and flora."0 More intense and frequent precipitation is
likely, causing more floods, landslides, avalanches, increased soil
erosion and greater flood runoff."' More powerful tropical
cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes, with higher peak wind speeds
and heavier precipitation12 present severe risks to human life, cat-
alyzing infectious diseases and epidemics." Scientists also pro-
ject more coastal erosion, the destruction of coastal structures and
infrastructure and damage to coastal ecosystems, such as coral
reefs and mangroves . 4 At the same time, some areas will experi-
ence additional and more intense droughts as precipitation
decreases.
The most severe effects of global warming will occur in the
Southern Hemisphere and Third World peoples will generally be
the first harmed, endure the most challenging consequences, and
BIOSCIENCE 701 (September 2008). Glacial melting and contraction of the Greenland
ice sheet will continue to contribute to sea level rise, as mass losses due to higher
temperatures occur more rapidly than gains from precipitation; indeed, the
Greenland ice sheet is enormous, holding a billion tons of fresh water, and if it is
released into the Arctic Ocean, sea levels will rise, placing severe stress on coastal
areas and low-lying communities and in the case of some islands, may mean their
disappearance. William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 147, 165-70 (1997); see also Henry W. McGee, Jr., Litigating Global
Warming: Substantive Law in Search of a Forum, 16 FoRDHAm ENvYL. L. REV. 371,
380-85 (2005); Elizabeth Kolbert, Global Warning, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 12, 2005,
at 39; IPCC WORKING GROUP II REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
70. Richard Wolfson & Stephen Schneider, Understanding Climate Science, in
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SuRvEY 30 (Stephen Schneider et al. eds., 2002)
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY]. Increased flooding and droughts will further
damage groups and shrink food supplies. IPCC WORKING GROUP 11 REPORT, supra
note 1, at 6.
71. See Wolfson & Schneider, supra note 70, at 31. Millions more people will be in
flood plains, and the effects will particularly be felt in Africa and Asia, while island
nations will be even more exposed to flooding.
72. Extra-tropical storm tracks are projected to move towards the poles and this
poleward movement will change wind, precipitation, and temperature patterns,
continuing a broad of observed trends over the last half-century. See Summary for
Policymnakers, supra note 4, at 16.
73. Pierrehumbert, supra note 5, at 578-79.
74. Ocean ecosystems are highly sensitive to temperature changes and higher
ocean temperatures will undoubtedly put them under stress. Summary for Policy
Makers, supra note 4, at 5.
75. Joan leypas & Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Coral Reefs and Climate Change:
Susceptibility and Consequences, in STATUS OF CARIB3BEAN CORAL REEFS AFTER
BLEACHING AND HURRICANES IN 2005 21 (Clive Wilkinson & David Souter, eds., 2008).
Global increases in precipitation are "very likely" to occur, while increases in areas
affected by drought are considered "likely." See Summary for Policymakers, supra
note 4, at 8-9.
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be the least equipped to address problems."6 Droughts, floods and
food scarcity are already problems in some areas of Africa and
these tribulations are likely to intensify. 7 Clashes over insuffi-
cient supplies of water, increasing desertification 7 1 countless cli-
mate refugees 79 and an additional 100 million people at risk for
hunger are all distinct possibilities. 0 At the same time, African
nations are poor and lack the resources to effectively deal with the
effects of climate change, since both technological and financial
resources are scarce."' Small is land states are doomed because of
76. This includes native communities of the polar region, whose habitat is already
under severe stress. See Margot RooseveltlShishmaref, Vanishing Alaska, TIME,
Sept. 27, 2004, at 68, available at http://www.time.com/time/Magazine/article/
,9171,1101041004-702149,0O.htmI (describing flooding of Eskimo villages); Shaw,
supra note 65. According to one study, "[dieveloping countries are twice more
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change than industrialized countries, and
island states are three times more vulnerable." CENTRE FOR SCIENCE &
ENVIRONMENT, GREEN POLITICS: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 16 (Anil
Agarwal et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter GREEN POLITICS].
77. Already vulnerable to drought, less rainfall is predicted, raising particular
difficulties regarding water resources. See Summary for Policymakers, supra note 4,
at 7 (explaining that drying has been observed in Southern Africa and parts of Asia
and that more intense and longer droughts have been observed in the tropics and
subtropics). Fourteen countries in Africa already suffer from water scarcity, and
another eleven nations are estimated to suffer similar fates within the next twenty-
five years. OxFAM, AFRICA - UP IN SMOKE?: THE SECOND REPORT FROM THE WORKING
GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 13 (2005), available at http:llwww.ox
fam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues/climate-change/downloads/africa-up-.in.smoke.pdf~m
=234&url=http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/i ssues/conflict~disasters/downloads/
asylumwpaper.pdf [hereinafter AFRICA - UP IN SMOKE?].
78. See Summary for Policymakers, supra note 4, at 7; AFRICA - UP IN SMOKE?,
supra note 77, at 18.
79. One think tank defines "climate refugees" as "people who have to leave their
habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations
in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate
change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity." The
Global Governance Project, Policy Forum on Climate Refugees, http://www.glogov.org/
?pageid=80 (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). Most climate refugees are expected to
originate from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and small island states. See Frank
Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol,
ENVT MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2008, available at http://www.environmientmagazine.org/
ArchivesfBack%201ssueslNovember-December%2O2008fBiermann-Boas-full.html.
80. Vector and water borne diseases are expected to increase as well as heat
stress, air pollution, water failures and water and food-borne diseases, which are
particularly problematic in the absence of sufficient medical services. AFRICA - UPIN
SMOKE?, supra note 77, at 18. Rapidly changing ecosystems invite coastal erosion,
flooding, and additional subsidence problems. Poor people rely on natural resources
for survival, but 25% to 40% of Afr-ica's natural habitats could be lost by 2085. Id. at 6.
81. Id. at 2-3; see WORLD BANK, AFRICA: REGIONAL BRIEF (2009), http://web.world
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAIJCOUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,menuPK:258652-page
PK: 146732-piPK: 146828-theSitePK:258644,00.html? (last updated Sept. 2009).
Africa is an enormous and diverse continent with varying levels of industrialization
144 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2
geography."' Rising sea levels bring the possibility of annihilation
in the worse circumstances,"3 and in any case, will exacerbate
flooding, intensify storm surges, erosion and other coastal hazards
and directly affect freshwater resources, agricultural production
and island biodiversity.11 Being in the path of storms, hurricanes,
and cyclones with economies heavily dependent on tourism, 5
there is little doubt the impact will be dire.8 Finally, the Inuit of
the Arctic face total destruction due to the Arctic's vulnerability to
climate change.87 This region will be discussed in more detail
below, but it is certain that deteriorating ice, permafrost and
snow8 " have had a tremendous impact, as the Inuit depend on
and poverty levels. Id. Moreover, given its size and varying population densities and
industrialization, it varies climatically. Id. Consequently, global warming will have
variable effects throughout the continent.
82. See John Crump, Snow, Sand, Ice and Sun: Climate Change and Equity in the
Arctic and Small Island Developing States, 8 SUSTAINAB3LE DEv. L. & POL'v 8, 9 (2008)
(stating that small island states are first to suffer consequences of climate change).
83. See Alexander Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climatic Change:
The End of the Line in International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J.
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 107, 112-13 (2004). Predictions of rising ocean levels over the next
100 years range from a best-case scenario of .18 meters (.6 feet) and a worst case of .59
meters (1.9 feet), if melting glacial ice sheets are not taken into account. Summary
for Policymnakers, supra note 4, at 13. If this melting is incorporated into the
calculations, the oceans could rise by four to six meters (thirteen to nineteen feet) and
perhaps as high as seven meters (twenty three feet), over the next century. Id. Since
many small island states are less than three to four meters above the present mean
sea level, the potential to become completely inundated is irrefutable. Id.
84. See Thiloma Neroni Slade, The Making of International Law: The Role of
Small Island States, 17 TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 531, 539-40 (2003).
85. Jacqueline M. Hamilton & Richard S. J. Tol, The Impact of Climate Change on
Tourism and Recreation, in HUMAN INDUCED CLIMATE CHANGE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
ASSESSMENT 146, 149 (Michael E. Schlesinger et al. eds., Cambridge University Press,
2007). For example, between 1995 and 2003, tourism accounted for 74.64% of total
exports in the Bahamas. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS DIVISION FOR SUSTAINAB3LE DEVELOPMENT, TRENDS IN SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 24 (2006), available at http://www.unorglesa/sustdev/Publications/
trends2006/trendsrpt2006.pdf;, ASPECTS OF TOURISM 22: TOURISM, RECREATION AND
CLIMATE CHAN1GE 15 (Colin Michael Hall & James E.S. Higham eds., 2005).
86. Beach erosion, soil salinization, increased stress on coastal ecosystems, and
damage to infrastructure will negatively impact tourism. Nobuo Mimura et al., Small
Islands, in IPCC WORKING GROUP II REPORT, supra note 1, at 687-90.
87. The Inuit have already suffered the consequences from climate change, and in
2005, they filed a petition with the Organization of American States Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. See Crump, supra note 82, at 11; SH-EILA WATT-
CLOUTIER ET AL., PETITION TO THE INTER AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
SEEKING RELIEF FROM VIOLATrIONS RESULTING FROM GLOBAL WARMING CAUSED BY
ACTS AND OM~ISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http:ll
www.ciel.orglPublicationsICC-Petition.7Dec05.pdf [hereinafter INUJIT PETITION].
88. Annual average Arctic temperatures are increasing at more than twice the
rate of temperatures around the planet. INUIT PETITION, supra note 87, at 36. The
region is already experiencing "deteriorating ice conditions, decreasing quantity and
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thick ice to travel, hunt and communicate between communities."9
The effect on Inuit life and culture has been profound, leading to
the relocation of some populations."
Of course, industrialized nations face some of the same physi-
cal consequences and some areas will suffer just as seriously as
Third World nations. The Netherlands presents one of the more
extreme cases because it is below sea level, and confronts inexora-
ble inundation." The United States and other nations have shore-
lines below sea leve192 while other states have islands that may
disappear." To varying extents, these areas face drought, unpre-
dictable weather patterns, distressed ecosystems and the like.
Moreover, hurricanes and storms regularly strike the United
States9 " and European nations have already experienced addi-
tional heat waves.9 " Yet, these nations caused the problem,
reaped the benefits of unbridled industrialization, and can halt its
quality of snow, unpredictable and unfamiliar weather, and a transfigured
landscape." Id. The petition notes that these changes are confirmed by scientific
studies, as well as Inuit elders and hunters' knowledge of their environment. Id. at
37.
89. The quality, quantity and timing of snowfall have also changed and
permafrost is melting at an alarming rate, causing "landslides, severe erosion and
loss of ground moisture, wetlands and lakes." INUIT PETITION, supra note 87, at 2.
For the Inuit people, this means serious effects on hunting, loss of traditional
knowledge, and everyday life. INUJIT PETITION, supra note 87, at 2. Increasingly
violent storms have exacerbated erosion, which exposes permafrost to warmer air and
water. INUIT PETITION, supra note 87, at 2-3; Jon Bowermaster, Global Warming
Changing Inuit Lands, Lives, Arctic Expedition Shows, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, May
15, 2007, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/05/070515-inuit-
arctic.html (discussing the changing levels of ice change landmarks used for
generations).
90. INUIT PETITION, supra note 7, at 3; Felicity Barringer, Flooded Villages File
Suite, Citing Corporate Link to Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at A16,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/us/27alaska.html?n=Top/News/
Science/Topics/Global%20Warming (describing effects of rising sea levels on Alaskan
villages).
91. The Netherlands - Britannica Online Encyclopedia (2009), http://www.
britannica/com/Ebcheckedltopic/409956/The-Netherlands.
92. See RICARDO AL~VAREZ ET AL., FEELING THE HEAT IN FLORIDA: GLOBAL WARMING
ON THE LOCAL LEVEL 1-2 (Jeff Fiedler et al. eds. 2001).
93. Burns, supra note 69, at 166-68.
94. While no hurricane can be attributed to climate change, the disaster following
Hurricane Katrina awakened the citizens of the U.S. to the reality of the possible
effects of climate change. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6,
at 1578. After a year hiatus, the nation again faced an active hurricane season with
two major hurricanes out of eight total hurricanes from the Atlantic. See NOAA
SATELLITE AND INFORMATION SERVICE NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER, 2007
ATLANIC OCEAN TROPICAL CYCLONES (2008), http:/flwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/
researchl2007/2007-atlantic-trop-cyclones.html.
95. See Summary for Policymnakers, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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advance; they are also in a much better position to deal with the
effects, however adverse."6 While adaptation capacities vary
widely across the planet and are as varied as the potential results
of global warming itself, technologically advanced industrialized
nations have a distinct advantage.
3. The Vicinity: Climate Change in Central America
A 2007 Report by Working Group 11 of the IPCC9 8 indicates
that Central America has already been affected by climate change
and additional damage is on the horizon.99 In western Central
America, precipitation has declined and temperature has risen.' 0
Increases in sea levels are probably already affecting coastal areas
throughout Latin America."0 ' Climate related disasters, including
such familiar events as hurricanes, increased 2.4 times between
1970 and 1999; this continues a pattern noted during the 1990s
and even more so between 2000 and 2005. 102 The coasts of Belize,
Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador are extremely vulnerable to
climate changes and extreme hydrometeorological events.' In
Nicaragua and Honduras, climate driven fluctuations in vector
densities, such as temperature, humidity, solar radiation and
rainfall have caused a spike in dengue fever and other maladies. 04
Unfortunately, the poorest communities are often the most vul-
nerable because they are frequently located near extreme events:
they subsist in hurricane paths, on unstable lands, in precarious
settlements, in low-lying areas, or in places prone to flooding from
96. See HIRoKi KUDO, STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WARMING COUNTERMEASURES IN
EUROPE AN~D IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN (Apr. 2004), available at http://eneken.ieej.orjp/
en/data/pdf1261.pdf.
97. For example, the U.S. could reduce emissions more easily due to its heavy
reliance on fossil fuels. Laura Thorns, A Comparative Analysis of International
Regimes on Ozone and Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 795, 829-30 (2001).
98. The IPCC considers and issues sector reports on the implications of climate
change in each regional segment of the globe, including Central America and has
issued sector reports on fresh water resources (chapter 3), ecosystems (chapter 4),
coastal systems (chapter 6), among others. See IPCC WORKING GROUP II REPORT,
supra note 1.
99. Unless otherwise noted, this section relies upon the following report by
Working Group II of the IPCC. Graciela Magrin et al., Chapter 13: Latin America, in
IPCC WORKING GROUP II REPORT, supra note 1, at 583.
100. Id,
101. Central America is dominated by the North America Monsoon System. Id. at
583-84.
102. Id. at 585.
103. Id. at 586-87.
104. Id.
146
2010] THE SPECTER OF CLIMATE CHANGE 147
rivers.'o5
Finally, the changing climate has meant the over-exploitation
of natural resources, which has been particularly devastating to
artisanal fishing in coastal waters and has also destroyed man-
grove, estuary and salt marsh habitats."'6 Projected temperature
and precipitation changes in Central America are expected to be
severe and unless mitigation strategies are quickly and efficiently
implemented, they are expected to devastate Central America's
economies and peoples. 07
Capabilities to cope and adapt vary but Central America is
generally more affluent and able to attract more foreign invest-
ment and funding than sub-Saharan Africa or small island
nations.0 " On the other hand, none of these nations are as rich or
technologically advanced as industrialized Northern Tier states,
meaning their adaptation capabilities are more limited, as is their
culpability in causing the problem.' 09 As will be discussed in more
detail, at least some middle income nations have been able to
attract supplementary funding and, to a lesser extent, technology
transfers by way of the CDM."10 Generally, middle income nations
are more industrialized and have superior internal capacities, and
are therefore in a better position than extremely poor or small
nations,"1 ' even if abilities to adjust are uneven. As nations on the
cusp of achieving economic modernization, they must adjust their
105. Extreme climatic events and their effects can be observed in part by looking at
the number and ferocity of hurricanes. Two of note were Hurricane Beta in November
of 2005, which affected Nicaragua by causing 4 deaths, 9,940 injuries as well as
destroyed homes, crops and wildlife; and Hurricane Stan, which affected Guatemala,
El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica with losses of U.S. $3,000 million and more
than 1,500 deaths and devastating the infrastructures of the affected countries in
October 2005. Id. at 585.
106. Id. at 606. Over-exploitation has also caused sanitation problems. Id.
107. Projected changes have been summarized as follows:
Central American: 2020 2050 2080
temperature changes (TC) - Dry Season +0.4 to +1.1 +1.0 to +3.0 +1.0 to +5.0
temperature changes (TC) - Wet Season +0.5 to +1.7 +1.0 to +4.0 +1.3 to +6.6
Precipitation changes ()-Dry Season -7 to +7 -12 to +5 -20 to +8
Precipitation changes ()-Wet Season -10 to +4 -15 to +3 -30 to +5
Id. at 594.
108. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1616 n.299 (listing
problems that discourage investment in low income nations).
109. For example, "[aldaptation for coasts will be more challenging in developing
countries than in developed countries due to constraints on adaptive capacity." IPCC,
Summary for Policy Makers, in IPCC WORKING GROUP 11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
110. See Martina Jung Host Country Attractiveness for CDM Non-sink Projects, 34
ENERGY POL'Y 2173 (2006) [hereinafter Host Country Attractiveness].
111. See infra Part II.C.
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development goals to a changing environment."'
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSE
A. Denial, Tepidity, Refusal, Entreaties
The international community successfully dealt with deple-
tion of the ozone layer' and hopes were high that a similar
response would be forthcoming regarding climate change, a prob-
lem that appeared to be comparable as a global problem in need of
a global solution. 1' 4 Indeed, given the magnitude of the current
and anticipated crisis, an urgent, vigorous and robust interna-
tional response might have been expected. Regrettably, the
response thus far has been modest at best. Part of the problem
lies in the causes of global warming, which are wide-ranging and
involve numerous industries and concerns. At least in the United
States, varied interests united to negatively influence the debate,
succeeding in convincing the public and policy makers that cli-
mate change either did not exist, had not been scientifically vali-
dated, would simply be too expensive to address or that mitigation
efforts would put the U.S at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
such nations as China which have not undertaken reduction com-
mitments."15 Furthermore, climate change is intimately tied to
industrialization, modern life and a consumer culture that encom-
passes rampant and sometimes wasteful consumption."1 ' It is
exceedingly difficult and costly to transform economies, societies
and cultures, and the inadequate legal mechanisms adopted thus
far reflect the complexities and hesitancy. Confronting climate
change entails potentially enormous short and medium term costs
in exchange for long term results, a configuration that makes tak-
ing expensive and politically unpalatable action anathema to poli-
ticians who have a relatively short-term political life."'
112. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1600-01.
113. For an extensive history of the international community's collaborative
response to ozone layer depletion, see generally CAMERON MAY, THE MONTREAL
PROTOCOL: CELEBRATING 20 YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS (Donald Kaaiaru
ed., Cameron May Ltd. 2007) [hereinafter MONTREAL PROTOCOL: ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRESS].
114. See Thorns, supra, note 97, at 843-44.
115. See Thorns, supra note 97, at 839-40.
116. With the current steep and permanent rise in the cost of energy, the age of
freewheeling consumption may be coming to an end. For a brilliant satirical
perspective of this recent trend, see Jon Mooallem, The End Is Near! (Yay!), N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Apr. 19, 2009, available at http://Www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/
magazine/l9town-t.html.
117. DoELLE, supra note 21, at 303-09 (discussing key challenges for climate
148
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In contrast, Third World nations distinguish between their
"development" emissions and the "luxury" emissions of industrial-
ized nations, whom they judge to have already used up their fair
share of the atmosphere."' 8 Third World nations also reason that
to adopt mandatory reduction commitments at this point in their
efforts to modernize would slow their development efforts and
essentially freeze global inequality."1 ' Those at the top of the eco-
nomic hierarchy would continue to reap the benefits of wealth
gained during an era unrestrained by expensive environmental
mandates, while Third World nations would be forced to slow their
efforts to join this enviable club.' Hence, Third World nations
have been united in insisting that those who caused the problem
must be the nations and peoples that discover and fund the neces-
sary remedies to both halt the damage and assist in adaptations
to what are now unavoidable consequences.'2 ' They have consist-
ently called for the transfer of appropriate technologies and addi-
tional funding that go beyond customary development
assistance. 2 '
Beyond these common goals however, Third World unanimity
rapidly fragments 2 3 because while climate change is a global prob-
lem requiring global solutions, it has varying implications even
change negotiations); Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 43; Martinez, supra note
46, at 413-14 (noting some political disagreements in the U.S.).
118. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1600-05.
119. Gate Keeping in Global Warming, supra note 66, at 112.
120. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1600.
121. For a distinctly Third World approach to climate change and other
environmental problems, see generally, GREEN POLITICS, supra note 76. At this point,
the question is whether we run into the brick wall at 20 mph or 100 mph, which would
be the case if we do not act quickly.
122. These goals were recently extended for another year at the twelfth meeting of
the Conference of the Parties. FCCC, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the
Parties at its Twelfth Session, 13 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docsl2006/copl2/eng/05a01.pdf. The ozone regime set the stage for Third
World countries insisting on additional funds to implement comprehensive
environmental agreements. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change: A Commentar-y, 18 YALE~F J. INT'L L. 451, 479-80
(1993). In the wake of the Montreal Protocol, which set definitive targets for ozone
depleting substances, these nations contended that they would not accept obligations
to limit ozone depleting substances without funding and technology. Funding
mechanisms were established in the London Amendment to help developing countries
implement the Montreal Protocol. London Amendment to Montreal Protocol art. 10,
June 27-29, 1990, 30 I.b.M. 537, available at http://ozone.unep.orgTreaties-and-
Ratificationl2Bi_1_London-ainendment.shtml.http://ozone.unep.orgTreaties-and_
Ratificationl2Bi_1_London-amendment.shtml.
123. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1602-03.
9
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across the Third World. 124 The calamities faced by some areas and
peoples such as island nations and perhaps more urgently, the
indigenous communities residing in the Arctic region have led
these nations and peoples to be among the most vocal and strident
voices for swift and robust international action.' At the other
end of the spectrum, oil-producing countries question whether
there really is a problem.' Rapidly industrializing nations such
as China are intent on immediate industrialization and believe
emission reduction commitments will only slow growth.2 2' These
nations have been among the most vociferous proponents of differ-
ential responsibilities to address a problem they view as not being
of their making.'
Thus, while global warming will have implications for every
area, country, and person, it can be localized and particularized,
both in its potential effects and in terms of possible solutions. The
impact is a function of geography and the means to adapt. The
latter, in turn, is a product of industrialization, income, the ability
to attract CDM projects and additional funds, as well as how a
nation is situated in the international economic and political hier-
archy. 29 The international solutions thus far reflect this complex-
ity and the varying array of interests.
124. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1580-89.
125. The Inuit nation has taken the bold step of suing the United States in the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights to require the U.S. to undertake mitigation
efforts. See INUIT PETITION, supra note 87; see also Climate Change and the Poorest
Nations, supra note 6, at 1622; Rebecca Tsosie, The Climate of Environmental Justice:
Taking Stock: Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate
Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1669-1671 (2007); Luke Cole, Dir., Ctr. On Race,
Poverty, & Envt., Comments at the University of Colorado Law School Conference:
The Climate of Environmental Justice: Taking Stock (Mar. 17, 2007).
126. See Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1602.
127. See, e.g., Dadi, supra note 8 (providing analysis of developmental and
environmental concerns in China); Rosenthal, supra note 8 (providing analysis of
same).
128. They assert that industrialized countries have used up their share of the
atmosphere. They also make a distinction between their development emissions and
western luxury emissions. See, e.g., Anil Agarwal, A Southern Perspective on Curbing
Global Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, supra note 70, at 375, 377.
These are valid points, especially in light of the huge numbers of poor people within
their borders and throughout the Global South. Unfortunately, the planet cannot
sustain these nuances and they must somehow be assisted in industrializing in a
maqnner that is less harmful to climate. Their calls for funding and technical
assistance must be heeded.
129. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6.
150
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B. The International Legal Response
Initial international efforts to understand and address cli-
mate change began within the scientific community, which was
becoming increasingly alarmed that mankind was causing irre-
versible damage to the Earth's climate. 3 0 By the 1970s, members
of the international scientific community began to convene regu-
larly as they amassed evidence."3 ' In 1979, these meetings
culminated in the first World Climate Conference, organized by
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations
Environment Programme ("UNEP").3 Throughout the eighties,
the scientific community strongly urged the political community
to rely upon and adopt the precautionary principle: to search for
alternatives to fossil fuel dependent economies and lifestyles
before there was absolute proof of harm."33
The international legal effort began in earnest with the 1992
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("FCCC").' Employ-
ing the Framework! Protocol model, which successfully phased out
ozone depleting chemicals,"3 ' the Convention contained few con-
crete commitments but inaugurated an institutional structure to
work towards agreement on concrete obligations. With regular
meetings of the parties, information gathering mechanisms, and a
bureaucracy to coordinate these efforts, 3 it was assumed that cli-
130. GREEN POLITICS, supra note 76, at 26. The earliest theories regarding the
negative effect of man-made emissions on the climate were advanced as early as 1827,
although proof was hard to come by. In the 20th century it became possible to
measure this effect and with computer modeling, project the results. Agenge France-
Presse, Global Warming: A Timeline, COSMOS MAG., Sept. 21, 2007, available at http:/
/www.cosmosmagazine.com/node/1595.
131. Hirono & Schroder, supra note 43, at 41; see generally DOELLE, supra note 21
(discussing the involvement of the scientific community in enacting environmental
policy).
132. Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43.
133. Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 41-42.
134. FCCC, supra note 2. The FCGC was adopted in May 1992 in New York after
fifteen months of negotiations. It was opened for signature at the 1992 UN
Conference on the Environment and Development in Brazil. For a more detailed
summary, see Climate Change and Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1582-85; see also
DOELLE, supra note 21, at 23; Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 45.
135. The framework and protocol approach was used with great success in
addressing the problem of ozone depletion. See generally Montreal Protocol, supra
note 39. Successive protocols resulted in the elimination of the production and use of
chemicals that were destroying the ozone layer; indeed, the atmosphere is recovering.
MONTREAL PROTOCOL: ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 113.
136. It was hoped the institutional structure would facilitate the negotiation of
binding commitments and indeed it was extraordinarily successful with respect to
ozone depletion. See generally MONTREAL PROTOCOL: ENvIRONMENTAL PROGRESS,
supra note 113.
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mate change was on a similar trajectory to the success achieved
with Ozone depletion. 137 Instead, it took over five years to negoti-
ate emission reduction commitments and the obligations assumed
were and remain profoundly inadequate. The Kyoto Protocol,
adopted in December 1997,38 is an exceedingly complex agree-
ment. Under the protocol, industrialized nations, designated as
Annex I nations, 39 agreed to binding emission reduction commit-
ments.14 0 If fully implemented, it would reduce the emissions of
industrialized nations to about 5% below 1990 levels,' a woefully
insufficient target.
Numerous details regarding implementation remained before
enough Annex I countries would ratify the instrument, which
meant additional years of negotiation"4 ' before agreement was
finally reached in 2001. The next three years entailed an intense
effort to gain a sufficient number of ratifications from Annex I
nations, 4 an endeavor made more challenging by the United
137. DOELLE, supra note 21, at 13-15. Ozone depletion, however, involved a small
group of chemicals and a small industry that developed substitutes and thus were in
favor of treaties to phase out the offending chemicals. See id. Indeed, most
Americans do not know what actually transpired-they simply eventually replaced
their appliances with new models that did not contain ozone depleting substances.
See id. Climate change, however, entails comprehensive changes across
industrialized societies and requires adjustments by numerous industries and the
citizenry at large. See id. It is radically different from addressing ozone depletion
and effective solutions have been elusive. See id.; see generally MONTREAL PROTOCOL:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 113; see also Thoms, supra note 97, at 799.
138. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2.
139. The Annex I nations are Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The European
Union is also a party under Annex 1. Each nation commits to reducing emissions to
1990 levels, but the actual percentages vary because each nation's emissions differ.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 3.1. Moreover, there is a great deal of flexibility
and various permissible mechanisms to meet these goals.
140. These country-specific commitments are based on the level of emissions
produced by each nation in combination with sinks, limited to afforestation,
reforestation, and deforestation since 1990. DOELLE, supra note 21; Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 2, at art. 3.3.
141. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 3.1; DOELLE, supra note 21, at 24-25.
142. See DOELLE, supra note 21, at 24-28 (providing detailed discussion of the
negotiations at various stages of bringing the Protocol into existence).
143. The Protocol requires ratification by 55 parties to the Convention,
"incorporating parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55
percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex
V. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 25.1.
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States' widely condemned decision not to ratify the Protocol.'"
American rejection made it necessary to make additional conces-
sions to obtain the requisite number of ratifications, further weak-
ening an already weak agreement."' 5 Nonetheless, by some
miracle, the Protocol came into force in 2005.146
The Protocol presents policies and measures.. to reduce car-
bon emissions and affords Annex I nations a considerable degree
of flexibility in meeting their reduction targets.'" While the focus
here will be the CDM, which directly involves non-Annex 1 devel-
oping nations, other options include emissions trading and joint
implementation. Annex I nations may engage in emissions trad-
ing, which allows parties to buy or sell the right to emit.' Emis-
sion trading permits those facing higher costs in reducing their
emissions, to purchase the right to emit from those finding it eas-
ier and cheaper to reduce their emissions. It also creates an incen-
tive to reduce GHG emissions, because the corresponding
remaining rights to emit can be sold. 50 A second option is joint
implementation, which permits Annex I nations to meet their
reduction targets in concert.'15 ' Joint implementation allows cross
border investment between Annex I nations which permits emis-
144. Soon after taking office, President Bush announced that the United States
would not ratify the Protocol. Julian Borger & Ian Black, US U-Turn on Emissions
Fuels Anger, THE; GUARMNn~, Mar. 15, 2001, at 15, available at http:ll
www.guardian.co.uk/environment2001/fmar/15/Usnews.globalwarming. A host of
world leaders condemned the Bush administration for its opposition to the treaty. See
Paul Meller, European Union Voices Concern for Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2001, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/29/us/european-union-
voices-concern-for-climate-pact.html.
145. Ratifications had to represent 55% of 1990 GHG emissions. Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 2, at art. 25. For a detailed discussion of the negotiations, see DOELLE,
supra note 21, at 27; Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 46-49.
146. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 25; DOELLE, supra note 21, at 27; Kim
Murphy, Russia moves to ratify Kyoto Protocol, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2004, at A6,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2004/09/24/russia-
moves-.to..ratify-.kyoto-protocol!.
147. This includes improving energy efficiency, protecting and enhancing sinks,
sustainable agricultural practices, and reducing counter-productive subsidies and
fiscal incentives. Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 50.
148. Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 50. Annex I nations agreed to reduce
emissions at least 5% below 1990 levels. Id. Individual national commitments are
listed in Annex B, with reductions ranging from 8% for the European Union (EU) to
an increase of 10% for Iceland. Id.
149. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 6 & 17.
150. Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 51.
151. This may mean many projects are undertaken in economies in transition,
where there are more opportunities to reduce emissions at a relatively low cost.
Hirono & Schroeder, supra note 43, at 50-51.
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sion reductions to be undertaken where they are cheapest. 52
Aimed primarily at nations in transition, it combines aspects of
emissions trading and projects, such as those authorized by the
CDM.153
Given the immediate need of developing Non-Annex I coun-
tries to modernize and provide essential services to their popula-
tions, they have not been required to undertake mandatory
reduction commitments, 5 4 and have refused to assume emission
reduction targets. 15 ' Thus, treaty parties have undertaken "differ-
entiated responsibilities" under the Protocol.' The notion of dif-
ferentiated responsibilities for industrialized nations versus Third
World nations has been a persistent demand of low and middle
income nations. If these nations are to ever address climate
change, they insist that industrialized nations take the initial
costly steps to reduce emissions and transfer funds and appropri-
ate technologies to help them undertake mitigation efforts. In
some respects, the CDM personifies both considerations.
C. The Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM allows Annex I nations to earn credits and thereby
meet reduction targets by means of clean development projects in
Non-Annex I developing nations. Presumably, these projects
would be less expensive than projects in industrialized nations,
and would have the additional benefit of helping countries mod-
ernize with less harm to the environment.' Thus, in some
respects the CDM is a safety valve for rich nations that is availa-
ble if domestic mitigation measures become too expensive.' The
152. These projects generate emission reduction units ("ERUs"). The end result
may be a proliferation of projects in economies in transition, where there are more
opportunities to reduce emissions at a relatively low cost. Hirono & Schroeder, supra
note 43, at 50-51.
153. DOELLE, supra note 21, at 35-36.
154. Only 38 nations are subject to the Protocol's mandatory obligations. Why
Electricity Matters, supra note 8, at 126. Some economists have argued that
developing countries would actually benefit by undertaking mandatory emission
reduction targets. See Kallbekken & Westskog, supra note 33, at 41, 57.
155. For an expansive explanation of Third World views on climate change, see
GREEN POLITICS, supra note 76, at 15-123.
156. Non-Annex I nations include most of the unindustrialized and industrializing
world. The former eastern bloc is in another category. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2,
at art. 10.
157. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 12; DOELLE, supra note 21, at 25-30.
All of the credits earned accrue to the Annex I nation. Id.
158. The CDM has been described as "a flexibility mechanism that offers
participating developing countries the opportunity to obtain cheap emission reduction
154
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CDM is a complex instrument that requires significant institu-
tional capacity in the host country,"' 9 entailing a great deal of
technical expertise."' Very poor nations and exceptionally small
economies lack institutional capacity, have no emissions to reduce
and are simply unattractive for many kinds of direct foreign
investment; most are unlikely to attract CDM projects."61 Despite
calls for, and an emphasis on, the equitable geographic distribu-
tion of CDM projects, most have gone to China, India, Brazil and
nations in Central and South America. 16 1 Indeed, middle income
nations such as Panama have been among the beneficiaries of
CDM projects. 6 '
credits by investing in greenhouse gas abatement or sequestration project in a
developing country and receiving in return emission credits that can be used to meet
their Kyoto targets." Kallbekken & Westskog, supra note 33, at 42. If reductions can
be attained in a less costly manner in Southern Tier nations, which have no emission
reduction targets, Annex I nations can still achieve their reduction targets, and do so
more cheaply. DOELLE, supra note 21, at 29-30.
159. See, e.g., FCCC CDM METHODOLOGIES PANEL, REPORT OF THE FORTIETH
MEETING OF THE METHODOLOGIES PANEL (Sept. 14-18 2009) (regarding methodological
approaches to CDM mechanism); see also Catherine Potvin et al., A Participatory
Approach to the Establishment of a Baseline Scenario for a Reforestation Clean
Development Mechanism Project, 12 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR
GLOBAL CHANGE 1341 (2007).
160. If a party chooses to participate in a CDM project, it must have a designated
national authority responsible for CDM project involvement in the country. Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 12; see also DOELLE, supra note 21, at 35. Many poor
nations lack the critical technical capacity necessary to undertake such projects. See
Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1614-17.
161. Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at 1614-15. See Host
Country Attractiveness, supra note 110, at 2174 (utilizing three criteria: "the scope for
cheap emissions reductions, the institutional capacity of a host country to process JI
[joint implementation] deals, and the general investment climate" to analyze the
likely distribution of CDM projects in host nations). Poor nations tend to have few
emissions to reduce, insufficient institutional capacity and have abysmal investment
climates. See id. at 2173-82 While nations may have varying degrees of these factors,
in the end they are unlikely to attract CDM projects. See id. at 2182-83.
162. The Marrakesh Accords emphasizes the importance of an equitable geographic
distribution of CDM project activities at regional and sub regional levels. Host
Country Attractiveness, supra note 110, at 2174; Conference of the Parties to the
FCCC on its Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, The
Marrakesh Accords & The Marrakesh Declaration, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2
(Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docscop7/13.pf. As of May
2007, there were 483 CDM projects and the largest beneficiaries were India (156);
Brazil (88); Mexico (73); and China (37) and most of the remainder have been
distributed in Southeast Asia and South and Central America. FCCC, CDM
Registration, http://www.cdm.unfc.int/statistics/registration/numofregistedprojectby
hostpartiespiechart.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
163. As of July 2009, Panama had attracted six CDM projects. FCCC, CDM
Registration, http://www.cdm.unfcc.int/statistics/registrationnmofregistedprojectby
hostpartiespiechart.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010). In terms of emissions to reduce,
institutional capacity, and general investment climate, Panama is among the nations
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Both Annex I nations and private entities can undertake
CDM projects in eligible countries, even if the decision to accept or
reject a project is up to the host country.1 6' The mechanism allows
project developers to earn carbon credits for projects that reduce
GHG emissions and contribute to the overall sustainability of host
countries."' 5 Emission reductions must be over and above busi-
ness as usual, requiring a determination of what business as
usual is and would be.6 The result is a considerable and quite
complex quandary involving the establishment of baselines, com-
paring emissions in a host country if a CDM project is undertaken
versus the emissions that would result in the absence of such a
project. 16 1 Since CDM project endeavors are likely to be coupled
with an overall increase in energy consumption, there is a risk
that the methods used to estimate baselines will result in an over-
estimation of emission reductions from CDM projects. 6 1
There are concerns about sustainability and the types of
projects that might be desired or offered under the CDM, such as
that have solid CDM capacity and a very good investment climate, but because it is
small geographically, it has small mitigation potential. Host Country Attractiveness,
supra note 110, at 2176-78. Latin America has been viewed as a "pioneer and
precursor of CDM projects in the carbon finance business" and thus when the CDM
became operational in 2003, six of the first nine first project methodologies approved
by the CDM Executive Board were from Latin America. IRiNA FALcoNErrT & KEN
NAGASAKA, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FOR PAN'AMvA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL: A STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT OPTrIONS (2001). Currently, China
dominates the CDM market, followed by India, although Latin America continues to
be a significant participant in the carbon market. Id.
164. Doelle believes some host countries will be unable to determine whether a
CDM project is "consistent with sustainable development" and will be unlikely to
reject projects. DOFbLE, supra note 21, at 32.
165. FALcoNErr & NAGASAKA, supra note 163, at 4.
166. POTVIN ET AL., supra note 159, at 1343.
167. FALCONErr & NAGASAKA, supra note 163, at 4.
168. See DOELLE, supra note 21, at 30-31. The Marrakesh decision provided several
options for establishing baselines: "1. Existing actual or historical emissions; 2.
Emissions from a technology that represents an economically attractive course of
action, taking into account barriers to investment; and 3. The average emissions of
similar project emissions of comparable project activities undertaken in the previous
five years in like circumstances and whose performance is among the top 20 percent
of their category." Id. Doelle predicts that "the first option is most likely to be applied
for energy efficiency or conservation projects, or for straight energy replacement
projects. Given that CDM projects are likely to combine economic development and
GHG emissions reduction, it is more than likely CDM project activities will be
associated with an increase in overall energy consumption, which makes the first
option unattractive to project participants as a baseline. For most CDM projects,
parties are therefore more likely to rely on options two and three. The net effect of
this is an overall overestimation of the emissions reductions achieved from CDM
projects." Id. at 31.
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nuclear power plants,"'9 so-called clean coal technology, large scale
hydro projects and sink projects such as forest plantations. 
17 0
Whether such decisions should be made at the national or interna-
tional level is a debatable topic. These concerns pit questions of
sovereignty against whether the international community should
accept credits for a particular project that may or may not cause
other environmental problems, even as it reduces GHG emissions.
Moreover, there are no requirements for meaningful environmen-
tal assessments or public participation at the local or interna-
tional levels. 171 At the local level, this may mean communities are
frozen out of the process and their habitats may be at risk or sacri-
ficed in the name of addressing climate change through CDM
projects. Although participation in a CDM project is voluntary,
there are fears in some quarters that nations may be pressured to
accept undesirable projects or might find it difficult to reject
offered projects. 7 On the other hand, at least some nations may
be able to seek out projects that best fit their need for particular
technologies and to pursue distinct modernization strategies.
7
1
Sink projects under the CDM are limited to "afforestation"
7 1
and "reforestation" 75 (collectively "AR") projects, both of which are
169. See DOELLE, supra note 21, at 31. Nuclear projects were declared ineligible as
CDM projects under the Marrakesh Accords. The same rule applied to joint
implementation projects. Id.
170. See DOELLE, supra note 21, at 43-45.
171. See DOELLE, supra note 21, at 31-32. Doelle notes that there is little
international oversight as to whether projects really are sustainable and whether the
reductions, to the extent there are reductions, should be recognized as meeting Annex
I nation targets. Thus the international community may be forced to accept credits
for projects that create other environmental problems. Id.
172. See DOELLE, supra note 21, at 32. Doelle postulates that the countries will be
approached by an Annex I country or a private entity with a project linked to a
specific technology or project and "[t~he 'choice' of the host country at that point will
be to . .. look a gift horse in the mouth and turn down the offer of assistance, or take
what is being offered." Id.
173. See Why Electricity Matters, supra note 8, at 149. For example, between 1993
and 2005, renewable energy programs created small power producer programs in five
Asian countries, which contributed substantially to the national energy supply. Id.
174. "Afforestation" is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not
been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting,
seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources. FCCC, CDM
Executive Board, Glossary of CDM Terms, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/
glossary-.of..CDM terms.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
175. "'Reforestation' is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to
forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of
natural seed sources, on land that was forested but that has been converted to non-
forested land. For the first commitment period, reforestation activities will be limited
to reforestation occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December
1989." Id. at 22.
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related to "human conversion of land from non-forest uses to for-
est.""'6 Small-scale AR projects include "agroforestry, community
forest plantations, forest regeneration, and improved fallows
while large-scale ones include industrial plantations." 77 Annex I
nations can only make limited use of sink credits to meet the com-
mitment targets,7 and for a number of complex reasons, proposed
projects have tended towards plantations. Despite many obsta-
cles, smaller projects may present opportunities to modify current
land use patterns. 7 9 If such policies do not yield the necessary
results, some scientists and policy makers have advocated avoid-
ing deforestation as a valid carbon emissions reduction
approach. 8 1 Scientists and policy-makers are studying whether
compensating small-scale farmers for avoiding deforestation
might result in "land use management and carbon sequestration
becom[ing] more attractive for the rural poor and be [ing] more
likely to be adopted in low income communities.""8 '
IV. EXPLORING PANAMA
A. The Emergence of a Nation 18 2
From the outset of European imperialism in Central America,
Panama's identity has been based upon a kind of geographic
destiny, as Panamanian fortunes fluctuated with the geopolitical
importance of the isthmus.' Explored and settled by the Spanish
176. POMVN ET AL., supra note 159, at 1342.
177. POTVIN ET AL., supra note 159, at 1342.
178. Annex I nations cannot use more than the equivalent of 1% of its assigned
amount from sinks credit under the CDM to meet its first commitment period target.
DOELLE, supra note 21, at 35. The maintenance of sinks, such as forests, were largely
excluded as was the notion of counting future avoided emissions. Id. at 48. This
means that land use projects aimed at preserving forests are ineligible, as are projects
that would not replace particular emissions but instead would foster future
development that would never utilize dirty technologies. See id. at 48.
179. POTVIN ET AL., supra note 159, at 1342.
180. See generally Oliver Coomes, Franque Grimard, Catherine Potvin & Philip
Sima, The Fate of the Tropical Forest: Carbon or Cattle?, 65 EcoLOGIcAL ECON. 207
(2008), available at http://biology.mcgill.cafaculty/potvinarticles/coomesetal-08.pdf
[hereinafter Carbon or Cattle?].
181. Id. at 208.
182. This very brief history is only to introduce the reader to Panama and more
particularly to the role of the Panama Canal and the United States in Panamanian
history. A complete history of the peoples, politics, ethos, and sociology of this diverse
and culturally rich nation is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally PANAMA: A
CouNTRY S'ruijy (Sandra W. Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 4th ed. 1989); Thayer
Watkins, Political and Economic History of Panama, http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/
watkins/panama.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
183. PANAiMA: A CouNTRY Svunvy, supra note 182, at xxiii.
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in the 16th century, 184 Panama remained part of the Spanish
Empire for 300 years (1538-1825) and was a crucial transporta-
tion interchange for shipping gold and silver to Spain,"' and for
transporting slaves throughout the Western hemisphere.' As
opposition to colonialism swept Central America in the early 19th
century, Panama became of strategic value in the revolutionary
struggle.' 87 Pressure for independence from the Spanish Empire
escalated' 8 and by 1825, under the leadership of Simon Bolivar,
the present day territories of Panama, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecua-
dor and Columbia formed the short-lived republic of Gran
Columbia.'
184. Rodrigo de Bastidas, sailing westward from Venezuela in 1501 in search of
gold, was the first European to explore the Isthmus of Panama. A year later,
Christopher Columbus arrived and established a short-lived settlement in the Darien.
As in North America, European explorers did not "discover" unpopulated territories.
The territory that is present day Panama has been populated for the last 11,000 years
and it was settled by the Chibichan, Cuna, Chomican, Cueva Guaymni, Choco, and
numerous other Indian tribes, some of which survive to this day. The size of the
Indian populations is unknown, but has been estimated at more than 500,000 people.
Jan Knippers Black & Edmundo Flores, Chapter 1: Hisotrical Setting, in PANAMA: A
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 182, at 6; ANTHONY G. COATES & OLGA F. LINARES,
CENTRAL AMERICA: A NATURAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 227 (Yale University Press
1997).
185. Jan Knippers Black & Edmundo Flares, Chapter 1: H-istorical Setting, in
PANAMA: A COUNTRY STrUDY, supra note 182, at 7-9. In 1513, Vasco Nunez de Balboa's
difficult expedition from the Atlantic to the Pacific established that the isthmus was
the conduit between these seas and Panama rapidly became a center and junction of
Spain's New World Empire. Gold and silver arrived from South America, was
transported across the Isthmus, loaded on ships and dispatched to Spain. The route
became known as the Camino Real, or royal road. Id. Panama was the principal
shipping point to and from South and Central America in colonial days. See COATES
& LINARES, supra note 184, at 181. Cities were created specifically because of
Panamanian exports-60 percent of all metals in the area were shipped through
Panama in the 1570s. Id.
186. Black & Flores, supra note 184, at 9.
187. For example, General Miranda of Venezuela offered a canal concession to
Britain in exchange for support. Black & Flores, supra note 184, at 15.
188. Panama's first act of separation from Spain was non-violent. When Simon
Bolivar secured the liberation of New Granada, the Spanish viceroy fled Columbia for
Panama where he ruled as a tyrant until his death in 1821. Black & Flores, supra
note 184, at 15. His replacement was a liberal constitutionalist who permitted a free
press and other liberties. Id. When he left for Ecuador in 1821, he left a Panamanian
native as acting governor. Id. Several Panamanian cities immediately initiated plans
to declare independence and the official day of Panamanian independence is
celebrated as November 28, 1821. Id.
189. After Panama declared independence, there were discussions as to whether it
should remain part of Columbia, which then was comprised of present-day Columbia
and Venezuela, or whether it should unite with Peru. It was decided that it would
remain part of Columbia and was designated a department with two provinces. With
the addition of Ecuador, the nation became known as Gran Columbia. Black &
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When the ephemeral Gran Columbia dissolved in 1830, Pan-
ama remained a province of Colombia, although it repeatedly
attempted to secede over the next 80 years. 9 0 Columbia success-
fully withstood these challenges to its control, often with the assis-
tance of the United States pursuant to the Bidlack-Mallarino
Treaty."9 ' This Pact granted the United States a concession to
build and operate a cross-Isthmus railroad and to use military
force to defend and protect both the railroad and Columbia. 19 2
This arrangement disintegrated in 1903, however, when Colum-
bia rejected a U.S. proposal for canal rights over the narrow isth-
mus. Panama proceeded to proclaim its independence and, with
U.S. backing, seceded from Colombia. The new nation promptly
signed a treaty with the US authorizing construction of a canal,
which marked the beginning of a new and distinct chapter in Pan-
amanian history. 9 '
Since the early days of the American republic, the United
States has perceived Central America as being within its sphere of
influence and thus subject to intervention at will if it was neces-
sary to protect its interests, however defined. The Canal placed
Panama at the center of the U.S. imagination regarding the trop-
ics and in particular, the jungle and the native.' "Turn of the
century U.S. natural science textbooks typically included a classi-
fication of the tropical flora, fauna, temperatures and diseases in
Flores, supra note 184, at 15-16; see also Panama, Encyclopedia Britannica Online,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-41028 (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
190. See Black & Flores, supra note 184, at 17. Three abortive attempts to separate
from Columbia occurred between 1830 and 1840 alone. Id. Between 1850 and 1900
Panama had 40 administrations, 50 riots, 5 attempted secessions, and 13 U.S.
interventions. Id. at 21. By 1903 Panama's independence from Columbia had earned
it virtual protectorate status in relation to the United States. ROSEMARY THORP,
PROGRESS, POVERTY AND EXCLUSION: AN EONOMIc HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE
20TH CENTURY 86 (1998).
191. The Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of 1846 was a pact signed by Nueva Granada
(now Colombia and Panama) and the United States, which granted the U.S. a right-
of-way across the Isthmus of Panama in exchange for a U.S. guarantee of neutrality
for the isthmus and the sovereignty of New Granada thereafter. Panama,
Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-41028 (last
visited Jan. 12, 2010).
192. The United States and Gran Columbia entered into the treaty in 1846.
Watkins, supra note 182.
193. The history of Panama in the 19th and 20th century is intimately tied to the
history of the Panama Canal, which will be discussed in more detail below. See text
and notes infra Part WVA.
194. Stephen Frenkel, Jungle Stories: North American Representations of Tropical
Panama, 86 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 317, 324 (1996). Explorers had presented nonwhite
people as "remnant exotic others, untouched by the outside world as were their
ancestors when Balboa passed that way." Id.
160
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Central America. . .. intertwined with . . . opinions concerning
heat, disease, dark-skinned peoples . . . and economic
underdevelopment."' Views of the people of Panama invariably
shaped negotiations regarding building and maintaining the
Canal, the nature of the American presence in the nation, and the
compensation owed to the Panamanian people for using their ter-
ritory to facilitate American commercial and military interests.
Still, from the founding of Panama, the U.S. and Panama
were essentially linked, with the U.S. freely and frequently inter-
fering in the Panamanian economy and political system as Pan-
ama essentially became a U.S. protectorate. Sovereignty over the
Canal Zone was never definitively settled and was a constant irri-
tant to Panamanians.' Throughout the 20th century, resent-
ment mounted, riots and violence sometimes erupted, payments
were increased, concessions were made and eventually, albeit
almost 100 years later, the U.S. exited.
B. Panama: The Ecology
Panama has a tropical climate with uniformly high tempera-
tures and little seasonal variation. Although temperatures on the
Pacific side of the isthmus are somewhat lower than on the Carib-
bean side, climate regions are determined more by rainfall than
temperature, which varies regionally from between approximately
four to twelve feet annually.' Panama's tropical environment
supports an abundance of plants; forests predominate, with spo-
radic patches of crops, shrubs and grasslands. Although nearly
40% of Panama remains wooded, deforestation is a continuing
threat,"9 ' while mangrove swamps proliferate along parts of both
coasts.' 9
195. Id. at 318. The transisthmus railroad also brought Panamanians in contact
with rough and tumble Americans headed to the west coast and exposed Americans to
Panama. Americans invariably brought their highly racialized politics, culture and
views with them. John Biesanz & Luke M. Smith, Race Relations in Panama and the
Canal Zone, 57 Am. J. OF Soc. 7, 10-11 (1951) (drawing a distinction between the
Canal Zone and the rest of Panama).
196. Mercer D. Tate, Panama Canal and Political Partnership, 25 J. OF POL. 119,
130 (1963).
197. Almost all of it falls from April to December. Patricia m~uck, Chapter 2: The
Society and its Environment, in PANmA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 182, at 73.
198. Tree cover has been reduced by more than 50% since the 1940s and
subsistence farming is widely practiced form the northeastern jungles to the
southwestern grasslands. Patricia muck, Chapter 2: The Society and its
Environment, in PAN~mA: A CouNR.Yra Swnvy, supra note 182, at 74.
199. Banana plantations abut the deltas near Costa Rica. Patricia muck, Chapter
1
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In some respects, Panama shares the ecological fate of other
South and Central American nations detailed above,"' 0 except its
economy is intimately tied to the Panama Canal. Still, tourism,
agriculture, and other industries are directly linked to its ecosys-
tems that in turn are being affected by climate change.2 0 ' Panama
is increasingly being exposed to extreme climate events, and
ecosystem changes have already led to the increased frequency
and force of floods and fires. Pest and disease outbreaks, such as
dengue and cattle deaths due to pneumonia, have increased and
coral reefs have undergone major bleaching episodes where local
sea surface temperatures have risen. 02 As the global climate has
grown warmer, ocean levels have begun to rise, which is having a
negative impact on some local communities. 0 ' Additional human
health consequences of climate change include increased rates of
asthma and other respiratory diseases, allergies and increased
risks of cancer. 0 Predictions of future adverse effects include:
changes in species distribution, changes in population size,
and changes in the timing of reproductions and migrations,
all of which increase the likelihood of non-linear, abrupt
irreversible changes. Ecosystem degradation can rarely be
reversed. Degradation of ecosystem services represents a
loss of natural assets that are an important part of Pan-
ama's ecological wealth. 0
2: The Society and its Environment, in PANAMA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 182, at
74.
200. CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERAB3ILITY 586 (Martin
L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ (follow "WG II Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability" hyperlink).
201. Interview by Roberto Lopez with Scott Muller, Founder of Conservaci6n y
Desarrollo Sostenible en Acci6n, http://www.fenixpanama.com/Panama-chmate-
change.html [hereinafter Muller Interview].
202. Id.
203. Id. He notes that recent strong storms have resulted in ocean flooding of
indigenous communities such as the Kuna. Also, recent studies by the Smithsonian
Tropical Research Institute have shown that since 1910 the average level of the sea in
Kuna. Yula has risen by more than 15 centimeters and the local sea level is now rising
around 2 cm a year. He predicts that eventually the Kuna will have to move the
majority of their communities to the mainland at some future point. Id.
204. CLIMATE CHANGE AND) HUMAN HEALTH: RISKS AND RESPONSES (A.J. McMichael
et al. eds., 2003), available at http://web.wkc.who.int/projects/uhe/heatw/. Diarrhea
from water borne illnesses is already one of the leading causes of childhood deaths.
See Umesh D. Parashar et al., The Global Burden of Diarrhoeal Disease in Children,
81 BiUL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 235, 236 (2003), available at http://www.who.intl
bulletin/voluines/SlI4IEditorial2.pdf.
205. See Muller Interview, supra. note 201; see also Andrea Gawrylewski, Opening
Pandora's Locks, 21 TmnE SCIENTIST 10 (2007) (discussing the natural mangrove flood
protection and the result if they are removed).
162
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Moreover, over the last 50 years there have been unprece-
dented changes in ecosystem management, chiefly because of
increased demands for food, fresh water, timber, fiber, and fuel. 0
The rainforests of Darien have been particularly impaired, as ero-
sion accelerates .2 0 ' 65,000 indigenous people, who are members of
three cultures-Kuna, Embera and Wounan-have lived tradi-
tional and environmentally sustainable existences for centuries,
but this is changing. 0 ' The almost pristine tropical island of
Coiba, located on the Pacific coast of the Panamanian province of
Veraguas, contains one of Central America's most diverse ecosys-
tems. 0 Currently designated as a national park, it is under
increasing pressure to be developed as a tourist destination,
meaning an influx of hotels and infrastructure. It is a study in
land use policies and the juxtaposition of economic development
and conservation. At the same time, Panama is a quite modern
nation with modern needs, such as energy. It is currently
embarked on a number of projects to produce needed energy and is
contemplating how to balance these efforts with conservation. It
also has indigenous groups that might stand in the way of some of
these efforts.
C. Panama and the Clean Development Mechanism
As previously noted, the CDM allows industrialized nations
listed in Annex I to meet their emission reduction commitments
by reducing emissions in developing nations; 10 Panama is pre-
cisely the kind of nation the CDM was designed to benefit. It pos-
206. Muller Interview, supra note 201. Muller notes that Panama's global
economic output in 2000 was greater than its output in the entire 19th century. In
Darien, human intervention and the migration of agricultural colonizers have led to
uncontrolled forestry, mining, agriculture and hunting, which have resulted in
deforestation, soil erosion, and disruption of the fragile ecological equilibrium and
dislocation of traditional indigenous practices. See id.
207. Muller Interview, supra note 201.
208. Muller Interview, supra note 201. Muller notes population shifts due to the
opening of the Darien Highway. He also cites a 1994 IUCN Resolution 19.66:
"Opening the Darien Gap." See id.
209. Carl Steinitz et al., A Delicate Balance: Conservation and Development
Scenarios for Panama's Coiba National Park, ENvTr., June 1, 2005, at 26. Though the
island was once a prison, it is now preserved from human activity following its
designation as a national park. Id.
210. For a variety of reasons, poor nations have generally been unable to attract
such projects. See generally Climate Change and the Poorest Nations, supra note 6, at
1617-19. Although the bulk of CDM projects have gone to China, India, Brazil and
Mexico, Panama has sought and attracted such projects. See FCCC, CDM Project
Activities, http://cdm.unfccc.intlProjects/registered.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
3
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sesses the necessary institutional capacity, has tropical forests
that could serve as potential sinks, and is on the brink of
expanding its modernization and industrialization endeavors,
which the international community has an interest in being car-
ried out in a climate friendly manner. Panama resembles many
middle-income nations in some respects, although its economy has
always been more service oriented than many other nations in
South and Central America."1 ' Panama is under pressure to diver-
sify its economy by, for example, increasing tourism, which in turn
places the typical pressures on resources and conservation. And
then there are the ecological challenges raised by the canal itself
and the expansion project in particular."1 '
At the heart of Panama's modernization efforts, is the
increase in energy production allowing for electricity to power the
rudiments of a modern society. At the same time, pressures on
pristine areas, implicate the role of deforestation and has meant
further stresses on eco-system management, even as these
projects do not fit comfortably within the CDM framework, since
this framework does not favor sink projects.21 ' Thus far, CDM
efforts in Panama have focused on the possibility of creating or
preserving sinks and producing cleaner energy. Both endeavors
raise a number of complex issues, including meeting the needs
and concerns of the more vulnerable members of various commu-
nities. These issues are likely to be common, as CDM projects are
pursued throughout the developing world.
1. The Persistent Need for Energy
Fossil-based energy is one of the most important causes of the
climate problem as energy is a fundamental underpinning of con-
temporary lifestyles. As a middle-income nation attempting to
improve its infrastructure and increase its industrial, trade, and
business production, the need for energy is constant and increas-
211. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, EARTHTRENDS COUNTRY PROFILES: PANAMA,
ECONOMIC INDICATORS, http://earthtrends.wri.orglpdf lihrary/country-profiles/eco-
cou-591.pdf. (determining that manufacturing, industries and construction are
responsible for one million of the eight million metric tons of annual emissions).
212. For a detailed discussion see notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
213. It may have a profound effect on indigenous groups and present serious
difficulties in shifting land use patterns. The CDM does not favor reforestation
projects, and tends to lean towards plantations. There is also debate regarding
methodological issues for CDM projects, especially concerning leakage. Leakage
occurs when afforestation activities are offset by deforestation elsewhere. POTVIN ET
AL., supra note 159, at 1342.
164
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ing. 14 In an effort to bring more electrical power to the entire
nation, Panama has embarked on a course to build numerous
hydroelectric dams' 15 -forty-seven as of April 1, 2008 2 1 -the kind
of venture that has previously faced withering criticism on ecologi-
cal grounds. 1 While there have been protests and organizing
efforts on the part of the latter, and some effort to allow a limited
amount of participation and influence, it appears more customary
to celebrate and idolize these voices while simultaneously ignoring
and marginalizing them."'
While it seems to be a classic case of balancing rather familiar
contending interests, there is now an additional thumb on the
scale, which is to avoid contributing to climate change. The influx
of CDM funds, however, is likely to tip the scales against commu-
nities that appear to stand in the way of energy production.
Panamanians tend to choose modernization 2 19 and thus dissent-
ing voices are less likely to prevail .2 2 ' The addition of CDM fund-
214. Total energy production in Panama has increased 39% since 1980, with energy
consumption rising in complement. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, EARTHTRENDS
COUNTRY PROFILES: PANAmA, ENERGY AND RESOURCES, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/
energy-resources/country-profile- 141.html.
215. Panama is building dams at an unprecedented rate with 31 expected to be
fully operational by 2013. Power Companies in Mini-hydro JV for Panama, INT'L
WATER POWER & DAm CONSTRUCTION, July 2, 2009, available at http://
www.waterpowermagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2053475.
216. Cultural Survival, Panama Dam Construction Steps Up the Pace, http://
www.culturalsurvival.org/node/8 19531.
217. See Tamar Gutner, World Bank Environmental Reform: Revising Lessons from
Agency Theory, 59 INT'L ORG. 773 (2005) (noting problems of inclusion of
environmental policy at Bank). For example, the Bank's dam building operation in
Sadar Sarovar, India, was not even complying with its own environmental and
resettlement policies. See id. at 774-75.
218. See Panama's Ngobe Indians Win Temporary Halt to Dam Construction, ENVT
NEWS SERVICE, June 22, 2009, http://www.ens-newswire.conlens/jun2009/2009-06-22-
01.asp. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ordered the government
of Panama to suspend construction of the dam, which the Ngobe Indians protested
would destroy the environment and their livelihood. In contrast, as a preventative
step, the FCCC, in Section 12 of the Addendum of the Kyoto Protocol, stipulates that
comments by local stakeholders should be submitted. Conference of the Parties
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov.
28-Dec. 10, 2005, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 64, U.N. Doe.
FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 1 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2005/cmpl/engO8a~l.pdf.
219. More than 78% of voters in the referendum approved expansion of the canal.
See Tucker Reals, Panamanians Vote to Expand Canal, CBS NEWS, Oct. 22, 2006,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/23/World/main2l 13478.shtnil.
220. Some scholars have "investigated strategic and structural factors that explain
variations in Kyoto Protocol ratification and the pace at which countries move to
ratify'." Sammy Zabran et al., Ecological Development and Global Climate Change: A
Cross-National Study of Kyoto Protocol Ratification, 20 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 37,
5
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ing may make further opportunities to increase energy production
through the use of dams almost irresistible.
2. Altering Land Use Patterns: Deforestation,
Reforestation & the CDM
Slowing tropical deforestation may be a more important fac-
tor in moderating climate change than has been previously under-
stood. 2 1 Parties to the FCCC have promulgated proposals that
"would enable trading of carbon saved by reducing tropical defor-
estation, just as carbon is currently traded from reducing indus-
trial emissions. "22This would bring nations, such as Panama,
with high forest cover and low rates of deforestation, decisively
within the new framework. 2 Moreover, without this opportunity
to sell carbon credits, countries with high forest cover and low
rates of deforestation might be denied a key inducement to main-
tain low deforestation rates. With preventative credits, however,
these countries would have a significant tool to manage new forest
exploitation or policies that encourage or permit deforestation. 2
39 (2007). Termed "ecological modernization" theory, it characterizes nations by their
economic, political and cultural development in terms of their readiness to commit to
and comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Id. This theory analyzes the connection between
economic development and developing institutions that regulate the impact of
humans on the natural environment. There is some debate regarding whether
nations must have industrialized, whether they can assimilate environmental signals
from international society, whether nations must transition through stages of
development or can leapfrog and the so on. The cultural dimension of ecological
modernization emphasizes the values and behaviors of mass publics towards nature.
Publics that value aesthetics, identity, and self-actualization over economic growth,
characterize ecologically modernized countries-termed postmaterialism. This
usually, but not necessarily, comes with economic development. Id. at 42.
221. "Carbon emissions from tropical deforestation are expected to increase
atmospheric C02 concentration by between 29 and 129 ppm [parts per million] within
100 years, which is much more than previously estimated." Gustavo A. B. da Fonseca
et al., No Forest Left Behind, 5 PLoS BIOLOGY 1645 (2007), available at http:ll
www.ibcperu.org/doc/isis/9058.pdf.
222. Id. at 1645.
223. Id. Nations with low rates of deforestation and high forest cover, contain 18%
of tropical forest carbon. Current proposals would award carbon credits to countries
based on their reductions of emissions from a recent historical reference rate. If such
proposals became law, countries with high forest cover and low rates of deforestation
would be left with little potential for reforestation credits under the Kyoto Protocol's
CDM. Low Deforestation Countries to See Least Benefit from Carbon Trading,
MONGABAY.COM, Aug. 13, 2007, available at http:/Inews.mongabay.com/2007/0813-
deforestation.html.
224. There is a possibility that introducing additional sources of carbon credits
could lower the price of carbon, thereby weakening the incentive to reduce
deforestation in countries where rates are high. But they still might be valuable in
reducing global C02 emissions. Fonseca et al., supra note 221.
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The high capital requisites required to invest in new land-use
practices is an acknowledged barrier to adopting potentially more
sustainable or desirable land-use practices among poor farmers. 2
Thus the possibilities of CDM projects could present unique oppor-
tunities to modify land-use patterns and increase carbon sinks. 2
These land use dilemmas can be observed in a study that
examined whether the villagers of the Ipeti-Embera region 2 17
could be persuaded to commit to carbon sink activities, such as
teak production 22 8 instead of engaging in cattle ranching, which
often means deforestation for grazing land. It seems that over the
life of the project (25 years), the carbon project would be a much
more profitable enterprise than raising cattle .2 9 But, the high
returns come from the high value of the teak that is sold at the
end of the 25 year period, meaning farmers will have a very long
"wait period" with respect to CDM projects. Conversely, raising
cattle generates a steady stream of revenue as well as other bene-
fits.23 0 Thus while farmers ultimately may gain more from the
CDM project, the returns are distant and risky for asset-poor
farmers who will be more likely to stick with their traditional cat-
tle ranches, despite strong community interest in a CDM affores-
225. POTVIN ET AL. supra note 159, at 1342. The authors conclude that Panama's
"lack of financial resources prevents the successful adoption of agroforestry practices
among smallholders . . . ." Id.
226. See id. ("Plantations on land previously dedicated to non-forest uses, from
small to medium size, have been proposed as viable AR strategies in several
communities in Chiapas, Mexico. . . . Benefits are likely to include increased
production to meet subsistence and monetary needs. However, potential drawbacks
include the reduction of land available for food production, increased vulnerability to
market forces and the uneven distribution of social and economic benefits among
participants.").
227. The study was based on a "participatory study conducted among the Emberd
people in the community of lpeti-Ember ... [which is] 120 km east of Panama City,
along the Pan-America Highway." Carbon or Cattle?, supra note 180, at 208. The
community has 3198 ha [hectacresi of land and 81 households who are engaged in a
.mix of subsistence and market-oriented agriculture, forest product extraction,
raising livestock, handicraft and off-farm wage labor. Households are both income
and asset poor, earning in 2004, $ 1, 110 US/year (range: $967-3495) and holding 38.8
ha [hectacresi of land . .. and $1236 on non-land assets . . . ." Id. at 208. For
additional information on the indigenous community residing in Ipeti-Emberi, see
PO'rVfN ET AL.., supra note 159, at 1342.
228. Carbon sink activities would include teak plantations. Carbon or Cattle?,
supra note 180.
229. Planting the teak would be financed by CDM carbon payments. Carbon or
Cattle?, supra note 180.
230. Other benefits of cattle ranching include low time demand, high liquidity (for
insurance and investment), limited sunk costs, lower price risk (cattle vs. carbon) and
limited coordination/administrative costs. Carbon or Cattle?, supra note 180, at 209.
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tation project and its promise of significant financial rewards. 3
One proffered solution would be to support villages in protect-
ing tropical forests and avoiding forest loss, in return for carbon
sequestration payments .23 2  Avoided deforestation-where
residents are compensated in return for preserving forests-would
represent a promising alternative to pasturing and raising cat-
tle.23 Under the Kyoto Protocol, however, only projects that con-
vert non-forested lands to forest, qualify for emission reduction
credits. 3 Yet, given that 20% of GHG emissions are due to tropi-
cal deforestation, discussions have begun on providing incentives
for emissions reductions that result from avoiding deforestation in
non-Annex I nations. 3 If current policies are not reconsidered, it
may be that countries that have done the best job protecting their
tropical forests from deforestation stand to gain the least from the
CDM regime.
3. Considering Local Voices
Indigenous cultures and communities are at risk as the priori-
ties of the nation are deemed to outweigh their more local and
particular interests. Development discourse, however, demands
consultation and taking into account the needs and aspirations of
local communities. Those who come to consult do so with mixed
intentions, however, whether it is corporations or the government
agencies whose primary concern is ensuring that specific dams are
built. 3
231. Carbon or Cattle?, supra note 180, at 209.
232. Another possibility would be to "give the full amount of CERs [emission
reduction credits] at the onset of the project to offset the establishment cost. ... [but it
could] lead to incentive compatibility problems in the long run." Carbon or Cattle?,
supra note 180, at 209. Another option is to have an NGO or business partner
subsidize the costs of establishing a plantation, which would reduce the investment
required by the participants. Id. The alternatives to reduce initial costs and realize
returns earlier are "few and fraught with high risk and moral hazard problems. In all
cases, the threat of fire or disease or pest outbreaks, premature cutting, and the
continuous need to monitor local conditions and enforce appropriate behavior would
reduce their attractiveness to external organizations." Id.
233. Carbon or Cattle?, supra note 180, at 209.
234. Id.
235. The World Bank is considering the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and a
voluntary carbon market that would operate alongside Kyoto. In Ipeti-Emberd it is
predicted that without a 0DM afforestation project, carbon stocks would decrease
from approximately 302,000 in 2004 to 156,000 in 2024. Forest cover is likely to fall
over the next 20 years without incentives. Carbon or Cattle?, supra note 180, at 209.
236. For example, an American corporation and the Panamanian government
partnered to develop a hydroelectric dam in Charco la Pava, Panama, aimed at
bringing electricity to Panama City, pressuring rural inhabitants to have their homes
168
2010] THE SPECTER OF CLIMATE CHANGE 169
However, it is difficult to listen to those one believes to be undevel-
oped .23 ' There is the notion of the noble environmentalist-mean-
ing the indigenous are in unison with the environment. Those
groups or peoples deemed not as unified with the natural world,
according to western precepts, are not accorded any voice; their
prerogatives are displaced by western voices, however sympa-
thetic. Even when groups fit within the 'noble indigenous
environmentalist' stereotype, often they are not heard even as
they attempt to speak. What is even more disconcerting is those
who purport to listen do not realize they are tone deaf. This is an
ominous trend when it comes to CDM projects, which are touted
as being not only in the interest of the nation, but also of the
entire world as they will reduce emissions of GHGs. Environmen-
tal anthropologists have noted that rise of global environmental-
ism,"' which is the province of large environmental organizations
that have undertaken to defend the environment and those who
support environmental sustainability, embraces and envelops
indigenous peoples who are viewed as repositories of local knowl-
edge. 3 ' These entities engage in particular discourses and indige-
bulldozed. Additionally, an affiliate of a Virgina-based corporation received a
concession from the Panamanian government to build two hydroelectric dams along
the Changuinola River in Bocas del Toro province, an area in the heart of Palo seco
Park, a nationally protected area. Ellen L. Lutz, Dam Nation, 31 CULTURAL SURVIVAL
Q. 16, 17 (2007).
237. The following summary, unless otherwise noted, is taken from conclusions
gleaned by Professor Carla Guerron-Montero in her study of the Archipelago of Bocas
del Toro and Panama City. She found that even when mechanisms were set up to
listen to local voices, those voices were largely unheard and/or ignored. Some were
found not to fit within the stereotypical mode of 'the noble environmentalist' and thus
were not even included in the discussion. Others appeared to be included, but were
routinely and roundly ignored. Moreover, indigenous participation was strong,
however largely ignored, treated as backward or dangerous, as no effort was made to
codifyr the wealth of empirical indigenous data into systematic social science data.
Carla Guerr6n-Montero, Marine Protected Areas in Panama: Grassroots Activism and
Advocacy, 64 HumAN ORGANIZATION 360, 367 (2005). This is not surprising. The idea
of listening to and incorporating the objects of development has become part of
development discourse, but it is rarely executed. See generally Deconstructing
Development, supra note 15; Declaration of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change
(2002) 7 A.I.L.R. 97 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/
2002/18.html.
238. See Guerron-Montero, supra note 237. Global environmentalism is defined as
the "environmental politics of politicians, resource managers, and scientists, who
partly as a result of their international recognition, imagined themselves to be in
charge of world-wide environmental management programs." Id. Examples of well-
known causes of global environmentalism include rain forest management, global
warming politics or marine resources harvesting. Id.
239. See Guerron-Montero, supra note 237, at 361. Indigenous peoples are viewed
and used by donor organizations depending on the latter's "conceptions of
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nous peoples "have to fit the environmental and indigenous rights
rhetoric of the incomparable qualities of indigenous knowledge." 40
Dams may meet the energy needs of wider Panama, however,
these dams may displace those residing in locations where such
dams are built. Nonetheless, these dams, as well as the encour-
agement of land use changes that might help rural communities,
require extensive community participation .2 4' The goal would be to
move beyond traditional discourses to new paradigms as the
Clean Development Mechanism gains strength and credence.
V. AN' EXPANDED CANAL
The Panama Canal has played and continues to play a larger
than life role in the economic and political life of Panama. It has
also been an integral part of Panamanian history since the 19th
century and played a key role in its independence. This section
will begin with a brief history of the Canal, which in many
respects continues and completes the history outlined in Part III,
environmental truth" and this notion has shifted. Id. Large environmental
organizations have migrated from the language of science in the 1970s and 1980s to a
discourse of inclusion in the 1990s (partly because of pressure from indigenous
communities and a shift back to a language of science and conservation.) Id. This
may be due in part to shifts in funding sources, which have shifted from individuals
and private foundations to mostly private corporations, such as Monsanto, Shell and
Chevron, and bilateral and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and
USAID. Id. Shifting accountability to these kinds of entities transforms discourse
from one that incorporates indigenous knowledge to one that gives primacy to
scientific language. Simply by framing research and advocacy agendas as global has
given a strong advantage to environmentalism because their work is perceived of as
urgent and thus more relevant.
240. See Guerron-Montero, supra note 237, at 361. For example, environmentalists
Thom Henley and Wade Davis who visited the Penan developed an environmental
discourse on the significance of Penan indigenous knowledge comprised of at least two
different conceptions of indigenous knowledge: (1) objectivist conceptions, focusing on
"the structural or systematic nature of indigenous knowledge and its utilitarian or
adaptive significance;" and (2) "the environmentalist conception of indigenous
knowledge, based on travel by activists to areas inhabited by indigenous people,
stresses knowledge from a western perspective." Id. (citing Peter Brosius,
Endangered Forests, Endangered People: Environmentalist Representations of
Indigenous Knowledge, 25 Ir'mIGENous ENVTL. KNOWLEDGE AND ITS TRANSFORMA-
TIONS: CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERsp. 47 (Roy Ellen et al. eds., 2000)).
241. In the Ipeti-EmberA project, both baseline and CDM scenarios were "developed
after numerous workshops, meetings, interviews, and participatory exercises all of
which provided ample room for discussion, debates and recognition of heterogeneity
within a seemingly homogenous community." POTVTN ET AL., supra note 159, at 1358.
The scenarios developed were "the people's best projections given current economic
constraints, land availability and anticipated future demographic and environmental
dynamics." Id. There is a growing body of evidence that local participation can
increase the accuracy of other data. Id.
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above."' 2 It will then discuss the current expansion project, the sci-
ence and implications of a melting Arctic Ocean and how these
two seemingly disparate events on opposite sides of the globe are
in fact very much related.
A. The Panama Canal: A Brief History24 3
The history of Panama is intimately tied to its geography and
within this history is the possibility of breaching the peninsula;
indeed the first survey exploring the possibility of a canal to cross
the narrow isthmus separating the Atlantic and Pacific oceans
was undertaken as early the 1520s and 1530s.144 Beginning in the
latter part of the 19th century, the irrepressible ambitions and
aspirations of the United States regarding Panama and a canal 45
lead to the intertwining of these two countries' fates. 4 '
During the 19th century, governments and private investors
in Great Britain, France and the United States periodically
demonstrated an interest in building a canal in Central America.
While other locations were weighed, Nicaragua and Panama were
the clear frontrunners from the outset . 47 The United States and
Columbia entered into the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty of 1846,4
242. See supra notes 155-200 and accompanying text.
243. For a complete and thorough history of the Panama Canal, see Panama Canal
Authority, A History of the Panama Canal: French and American Efforts, httpJll
www.pancanal.com/eng/history/index.html [hereinafter History of Canal].
244. Black & Flores, supra note 184, at 9. As the isthmus became increasingly
important for transporting gold, silver, and other resources, the delays and
impediments posed by the trail known as the Camino Real (Royal Road) inspired
surveys ordered by the Spanish Crown. Id. In 1534, Charles V of Spain ordered the
Panama regional governor to survey a route to the Pacific following the Chagres
River. History of Canal, supra note 245. It was the first survey for a canal through
Panama and it largely followed the course of the canal that was ultimately built. Id.
245. The United States was seeking a quicker passage to the west coast in the wake
of the California gold rush in 1848. Nonetheless, U.S. interest in a canal came
relatively late and it was not necessarily focused on Panama. PANAMA: A COUNTRY
STUDY, supra note 182, at xxiii; Aims McGun.NEss, PATH OF EMPIRE: PANAMA AND THE
CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH 5 (2008).
246. The Canal inescapably linked Panama to the United States, and thus the
Canal has dominated Panamanian politics and foreign policy, beginning with its role
in creating the nation. After securing rights to build and then constructing the Canal,
Panama became a virtual protectorate of the United States, and the precedent of
American intervention established at independence frequently reoccurred during the
first half of the twentieth century. History of Canal, supra note 245; PANAMA: A
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 159, at xxiii-xxv.
247. Black & Flores, supra note 184, at 19.
248. Black & Flores, supra note 184, at 19. The treaty was actually ratified and
became effective in 1848. It gave the U.S. the right to build and operate the railroad
and to use military force to protect the railroad and Columbian territory. Id. "The
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which inter alia, gave the United States the right to build, oper-
ate, and protect a cross-Isthmus railroad ;2 11 it foreshadowed the
Canal in some respects, and certainly encouraged those envisag-
ing a cross-Isthmus channel. 5
Yet, it was a French company that obtained a concession from
Columbia and undertook the first bona fide effort to actually con-
struct a canal .2 51 These efforts began in 1888 and continued for
the next 20 years although, for a variety of reasons, including the
harsh Panamanian climate, disease, 5 2 and obstacles that required
yet to be discovered technology to be overcome, 5 they ultimately
proved unsuccessful. 254 The French company, New Interoceanic,
treaty removed the existing restrictive tariffs and gave the United States and its
citizens the right of free transit of persons and goods over any road or canal that
might be constructed in the isthmus. In addition, the United States guaranteed the
neutrality of the isthmus and Colombia's sovereignty over it, with a view to ensuring
uninterrupted transit for the duration of the treaty, which was to be twenty years or
as long thereafter as the parties gave no notice to revise it." Id.
249. On January 28, 1855, the first train from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean
traversed the completed track of the Panama Railway. Black & Flores, supra note
184, at 18. "Between 1848 and 1869, about 375,000 persons crossed the isthmus from
the Atlantic to the Pacific, and 225,000 crossed in the opposite direction." Id. The
Railroad also led to the founding of the new port city of Col6n at the Atlantic
terminus; it remains the second largest city in Panama to this day. Id. With the 1869
completion of the first transcontinental RR in the United States, passenger and
freight traffic across the isthmus declined. Id.
250. "The railroad track followed generally the line of the present canal." Black &
Flores, supra note 184, at 18.
251. See History of Canal, supra note 245. In the name of La Societe Civile
Internationale du Canal Interoceanique de Darien, Lucien Wyse negotiated a treaty
with the Columbian government to build an interoceanic canal through Panama.
Known as the Wyse Concession, this treaty provided the waterway would revert to
the Columbian government after 99 years. Id.
252. The eradication of various tropical diseases was a large part of America's
successful effort.
253. Ferdinand de Lesseps built the Suez Canal. The rights were awarded to
Ferdinand de Lesseps and the Universal Interoceanic Canal Company. Construction
began in 1881, but this and a subsequent French company, the New Company of the
Interoceanic Canal Company (New Interoceanic), were unsuccessful. Black & Flores,
supra note 184, at 19.
254. Emory R. Johnson, The Panama Canal: The Title and Concession, 18 POL.
SCIENCE Q. 197, 199-202 (1903). By 1889, disease, the harsh Panamanian
environment, and financial scandals in France led to the Universal Interoceanic
Canal Company's bankruptcy. A new company, "The New Company of the
Interoceanic Canal" assumed its assets but it too was met by disappointment and
failure. Id. A visit to the Panama Canal exhibit on the building of the Canal
indicates that U.S. companies and engineers devised a number of technological
innovations that may have had much to do with their ultimate success. For a detailed
history of the French effort to build a canal in Panama, see History of Canal, supra
note 245.
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eventually sought to sell its interests to the United States, 5
which under the McKinley administration, was considering a
canal via Nicaragua. 5 When McKinley was assassinated and
Theodore Roosevelt became President, support for a canal gained
momentum, as Roosevelt believed that it was essential and indis-
pensable to protecting and advancing American interests. 5 After
an intense internal American political debate, Panama prevailed
over Nicaragua as the preferred canal site and 255 America began
negotiating with Columbia for a concession to build the Canal
through the then Columbian province of Panama. The resulting
Hay-Herran Treaty was rejected by Columbia; Roosevelt then
backed Panama's independence movement. 5 Panama declared
independence on December 2, 1903, but it is doubtful that the
forces of liberation would have prevailed without the U.S. military
255. See History of Canal, supra note 245. By 1898 the Company had depleted half
its original capital and had to abandon the project or sell it; they decided on the latter.
Id. The New Company hired William Nelson Cromwell, a New York lawyer, to lobby
the United States Congress to induce the U.S. Government to buy New Company's
interests in the Canal. Charles D. Ameringer, The Panama Canal Lobby of Philippe
Bunau-Varilla and William Nelson Cromwell, 68 Amv. HIsT. REV. 346, 347 (1963). It
was a hard sell, but five years later the U.S. agreed. History of Canal, supra note 245.
256. In 1899, Congress created and funded The U.S. Isthmian Canal Commission of
1899-1902 to study the possibility of alternative routes and in 1901, the commission
decided on the Nicaraguan route, which had official and popular support. History of
Canal, supra note 245. The Nicaraguan route was longer, but it was believed to enjoy
engineering advantages. Although Nicaragua had several active volcanoes, its lower
altitude made building easier and two lakes in the area-Lake Managua and Lake
Nicaragua-could be integrated into the canal system. OVIDio DiAxZ EspINo, How
WALL STREET CREATED A NATION: J.P. MORGAN, TEDDY ROOSEVELT, AND THE PANAMA
CANAL 12-14 (2001). Moreover, given French failures Panama seemed to be a means
to defeat, whereas Nicaragua was a clean slate. History of Canal, supra note 245.
257. History of Canal, supra note 245. This came home to Roosevelt when a naval
ship based in San Francisco had to sail around the horn to get to Cuba at the start of
the Spanish American War. The trip took 67 days and made the desirability of a
canal glaringly apparent. Id.
258. For a detailed history of the American debates, political wrangling and
deliberations resulting in Panama see History of Canal, supra note 245. In August
1902, the U.S. Senate approved the Spooner Act for a Panamanian route canal. The
Spooner Act authorized President Roosevelt to buy the assets of the French New
Company of the Interoceanic Canal. The Act also gave the President permission to
negotiate with Columbia and the territories they possessed for concession. For a
contemporary account see Johnson, supra note 254, at 197.
259. When Columbia rejected the treaty, the United States backed a Panamanian
rebellion. President Roosevelt was willing to make a show of force and the United
States, which had troops in the area to guard the Panama Railroad, added extra
troops and warships which enabled Panama to gain independence in only a few days.
Roosevelt "dispatched warships to both sides of the isthmus - the Atlanta, Maine,
Mayflower and Prairie at Colon and the Boston, Marblehead, Concord and Wyoming
at Panama City - thus effectively blocking the sea approaches." History of Canal,
supra note 245.
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presence."' 0 While this was a triumph for the U.S. with respect to
the Canal, it damaged U.S.-Latin American relations for many
years."6 '
The new, independent Republic of Panama promptly ratified
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty on February 23, 1904, and upon
ratification Panama received 10 million dollars26 2 in exchange for
relinquishing sovereignty over a ten mile strip of land on either
side of the Canal, which became known as the Panama Canal
Zone. 6
Construction, which would last for ten years, began on May 4,
1904 .21 It entailed numerous technical innovations 2 6 ' advances in
entomology 2 6 and other sciences. 6 ' Because most of the manual
laborers were from the West Indies, 6 the project predictably
brought the American brand of racism and discrimination to
building the canal and to life within the Canal Zone .26 ' Accord-
260. History of Canal, supra note 245.
261. History of Canal, supra note 245. For a short review of U.S.-Central American
relations, see Lars Schoultz, Latin America and the United States, in CENTRAL
AMERICA: A NA~ruRALI ANTD CULTuRAL HISTORY 49, (Anthony Coates ed., 1987).
262. History of Canal, supra note 245. The U.S. agreed to annual payments of
$250,000 commencing nine years after the ratification. Tate, supra note 196, at 120
263. History of Canal, supra note 245. The U.S. was granted the right to use,
occupy and "control a zone of the land and land under water for the construction,
maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection." Tate, supra note 196, at 120. It
was also granted "all the rights, powers and authority within the zone." Id. Panama
also agreed not to tax any property or employees of the Canal. The cities of Colon and
Panama were excluded from the ten mile wide Zone, but it included lands and waters
outside the Zone that were necessary and convenient for the Canal and other
incidental enterprises. Id. For a detailed contemporaneous account of the
deliberations leading to the American agreement to build the Canal, see id.
264. History of Canal, supra note 245. The Panama Canal was completed in 1914,
and first ship passed through on January 7, 1914, although the official opening was
August 15. It was built at a cost of $375,000,000, including $10,000,000 paid to
Panama and the $40,000,000 paid to the French company that owned the previous
concession. Id.
265. Innovations included a dirt-spreader, track-shifter and more powerful steam
shovels. For additional advances and further details, see History of Canal, supra note
245.
266. See e.g., Paul Sutter, Nature's Agents or Agents of Empire? Entomological
Workers and Environmental Change during the Construction of the Panama Canal,
98 Isis 724 (2007).
267. History of Canal, supra note 245.
268. Building the Canal required more laborers than could possibly be supplied by
Panama, and thus labor had to be recruited from outside the country. While high
skilled technical labor came from America, most of the manual laborers hailed from
various islands in the West Indies. History of Canal, supra note 245.
269. A 1963 account notes: 'Itihere were not enough men for the job in Panama,
and there were limitations on where workers could be obtained: Orientals could be
legally employed in Panama only by letting work out on contract; Italians were tried
2010] THE SPECTER OF CLIMATE CHANGE 17
ingly racial segregation, which was an integral part of the Ameri-
can landscape, was brought to the Canal Zone, where the races
were separated by law and custom. 270 Descendants of these work-
ers can be found within the contemporary racial mosaic of present
day Panama and they face varying degrees of segregation, often
based on language.2 7
Although the imperial political machinations that led to the
building of the Canal and the racial and political legacy it wrought
were far from ideal, the technological feat that resulted in the
Panama Canal cannot be underestimated 27 2 nor can the lucrative
nature of a Canal linking the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Over
time, however, with the waves of self-determination enveloping
the international community, the gradually declining hubris of
the United States, and the growing resentment of the Panama-
nian people, U.S. control was challenged as the Panamanian peo-
ple became increasingly impatient. This evolution can be observed
in contemporaneous accounts of the Canal and the Canal Zone,
and the series of modifications to the original compact, which
finally culminated in a new treaty governing relations between
the two nations .2 3 The wide grant of sovereignty over a zone that
encompassed not only the Canal, but a zone of 10 miles on either
side of the Canal, in due course became exceedingly problematic
for Panamanians, who resented a foreign sovereign within their
borders, and what they perceived as colonial control over the
Canal. 7 Panamanians increasingly sought additional compensa-
tion and control over the Canal and the Canal Zone and a series of
modifications to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty2 75 and continually
but lacked stamina to withstand the heat; Spaniards were too scarce. Reluctantly,
the government turned to the West Indian Negro though his efficiency was said to be
only one-third that of ordinary labor in the United States. The wage began at twenty
cents an hour." Tate, supra note 196, at 120 (citations omitted); see also Biesanz &
Smith, supra note 195, at 8.
270. See Biesanz & Smith, supra note 195, at 8. Wage rates were discriminatory,
with U.S. laborers being paid a higher rate than all others, most of whom were black
and were also excluded from many higher-level jobs. Tate, supra note 196, at 123-24.
271. See Biesanz & Smith, supra note 195, at 8. The racial mosaic of Panama is
complex and has been greatly affected by the Canal and the U.S. presence. A flli
discussion is beyond the reach of this paper.
272. History of Canal, supra note 245 (detailing technical aspects of the Canal).
For a pre-Amnerican involvement, scientific view of the French effort, see generally
The Panama Canal, 6 SCIENCE 503 (1885).
273. The 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaties abrogated the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty.
See, e.g., Tate, supra note 196, at 121-23; J.C.J. Metford, The Background to Panama,
40 INT'L AFFAiRs 277 (1964).
274. See Tate, supra note 196, at 133.
275. See Tate, supra note 196, at 12 1. In 1936, the General Treaty of Friendship
5
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increased the yearly sum due from the United States."' 6 Finally,
on December 31, 1999, after a protracted struggle within the U.S.
and with Panama,"' the United States ceded control of the Pan-
ama Canal.
B. Expanding the Panama Canal
1. Politics and Rationales
The Panama Canal Authority ("PCA") determined that some-
time between 2009 and 2012, the Canal would reach its maximum
capacity, and lacking expansion, its capacity would stagnate .2 18
and Cooperation was signed, which altered the 1903 treaty giving U.S. canal rights.
Then, in 1955 the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation was enacted,
again altering the amount the U.S. was required to pay Panama. Id.
276. See Tate, supra note 196, at 120-22. In the General Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, ratified after three years in 1939, the U.S. renounced the grant of lands
and waters outside the Canal Zone and residence and commerce in the Zone was
limited to certain specific classes of persons with particular employment relationships
in the Zone. Additionally, the annual payment was raised to $430,000 and Panama
was granted a corridor through the Zone to Colon, which had been accessible only by
ship under the terms of the 1903 Treaty. After eight years of negotiation and with a
great deal of pressure by Panama, on January 25, 1955, the two nations entered into
a Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, which amended the original
1903 treaty and increased the annual annuity to $1,930,000 and gave Panama the
right to tax the income of Canal residents, regardiess of their residence; albeit not the
income of U.S. citizens or military personnel. Id. at 121.
277. See Lieutenant Colonel Gregory M. Huckabee, Suffering the Slings and
Arrows of the Panama Canal Treaties, 40 Navy L. Rev. 65, 72 (1992). The following is
the Lieutenant Colonel Huckabee's description of the process of handing over the
Canal: "[the second treaty, called the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality
and Operation of the Panama Canal, declared the waterway to be permanently
neutral, as would be any canals yet to be built. The most difficult part of this compact
was Article V which held that, after termination of the Panama Canal Treaty on
December 31, 1999, only the Republic of Panama shall be authorized to operate and
maintain military forces, defense sites, and military installations within Panama.
The United States, however, was to continue to defend the Canal from external
threats. After the Treaties' signing in September 1977, they were sent to the U.S.
Senate for its 'advice and consent,' triggering one of the most protracted and torturous
chapters in the history of the U.S. Senate." Id.
278. PANAMAiA CAAL AumHo~RrY, PROPOSAL FOR THE ExPAN'SION OF THE PANAMA
CANAL: THIRD SET OF LOCKS PROJTECT 39 (2006), http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/
docimnentos/propuesta/acp-expansion-proposalpdf. For example, the size of vessels
increased by 20% during the last five years. The larger the vessel, the smaller number
of transits the Canal can handle. Additionally, the vessels passing through the Canal
demand an increasing amount of services. Id. at 34. Without expansion, the revenue
increases would be in the form of toll increases, which in turn risks driving clients
away. Additionally, without expansion, service will deteriorate and become less
competitive. Id. at 39. Without the capacity to meet the forecasted demand, the
Canal will have a less diversified user base, will become more strategically vulnerable
and will affect its ability to serve the most efficient vessels. Id. at 41.
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Thus it proposed adding a new larger-capacity lock 2 11 to the Canal
system and, on July 14, 2006, the Panama National Assembly
unanimously approved this proposal. 8 Ultimately, however, in
accordance with the Panama constitution, the Panamanian gov-
ernment left the final decision regarding expansion to the Pana-
manian people,2 8 who approved it in a 2006 national
referendum. 8 2 Construction began in 2007 and will conclude in
2014, which is the Canal's 100th anniversary. 8 By expanding the
Canal, the Canal Authority anticipates increasing the Canal's
capacity to meet growing demand, as well as maintaining the
Canal's competitiveness and the value of the maritime route
through Panama.
The expansion project will be the largest project regarding the
Canal since it was originally constructed; it will double the
Canal's capacity and permit additional traffic by creating a new
lane of travel via a new set of locks; it will allow the Canal to
accommodate ships that can transport more than 12,000 contain-
ers. 84 The project is estimated to cost approximately $5.25 billion
279. The length of the Panama Canal is approximately 51 miles. A trip along the
canal from its Atlantic entrance would take you through a 7 mile dredged channel in
Lim6n Bay. The canal then proceeds for a distance of 11.5 miles to the Gatun Locks.
This series of three locks raise ships 85 feet to Gatun Lake. It continues south
through a channel in Gatun Lake for 32 miles to Gamboa, where the Culebra Cut
begins. This channel through the Cut is 8 miles long and 492 feet wide. At the end of
this Cut are the locks at Pedro Miguel. The Pedro Miguel locks lower ships 52.5 feet
to a lake, which then takes ships to the Mirafiores Locks which lower ships 52 feet to
sea level at the Canal's Pacific terminus in the bay of Panama. Jaime Rodriguez,
Channeling the Oceans: Modernizing the Panama Canal with GPS, POINT OF
BEGINNING, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.pobonline.comlCDA/Archives
(follow "November 2004"' hyperlink; then follow "Channeling the Oceans" hyperlink).
280. Press Release, Embassy of Panama, Panama Canal Expansion Takes Major
Step Forward, (July 17, 2006), http://www.embassyofpanama.org/canal/.
281. Gawrylewski, supra note 205.
282. Panama Votes for a Bigger Canal, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfmn?story-id=El 1_RDST
QJQ. Some 78% of Panamanians voted in favor of the expansion referendum. Id.
283. The new set of locks will be constructed between 2007 and 2014, and is
projected to be open to transit at the beginning of 2015. Chris Kraut, Panama Canal
Expansion is Chugging Along, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2009, available at http:ll
articles.latimes.com/2009/Jun/Ol/business/fi-panama-canall.
284. 'Panamax' is a maritime shipping standard that refers to ships that can fit
through the current locks. The new locks will allow post Panamax ships to journey
through the Canal. Trade between Asia and the Americas has exploded in recent
decades and many carriers are using ships that are 50% wider than Panamax vessels;
these huge ships can carry 8,000 cargo vessels each. These shipments currently off-
load on the U.S. west coast. Goods are then transported across the U.S. and Canada
by rail. With a wider Canal, goods will arrive in the eastern part of North America
directly. Brazil and Venezuela have been increasing grain, oil and other raw material
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dollars, and will ultimately be financed by Canal users via the toll
system; 85 thus the Canal Expansion proposal maintains that the
project will not burden the country financially nor require that the
state maintain debt. 86 The project also promises to financially
benefit Panama by offering employment and added links to the
global economy. 8
2. Plans and Strategies
The PCA is responsible for safeguarding the water resources
of the Canal Watershed and they profess to have developed a
strategy of programs to protect the environment and the natural
resources of the watershed. 8 In determining the best way to
expand the Canal, the proposal concludes that a third set of locks
project is "environmentally viable .28 9  Thus the expansion plan
includes constructing two additional sets of locks that will flank
the already existing Gatun Locks (at the Atlantic head of Gatun
Lake) and the Miraflores Locks (at the Pacific end of the Canal). 9
sales to China and are also counting on a third, broader lock. Larne Matalon,
Panama Canal Expansion Spurs Environmental Debate, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS,
June 27, 2007, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.coim/news/2007/06/070627-
panama-canal.html. According to the Panama Canal Authority ("PCA"): "The
investment will double the Canal's capacity, increase its operational efficiency and
provide economic benefits to Panama, which in turn will improve the quality of life for
all Panamanians." PANimu CANALAuTHOaRrY, supra note 278, at 9. According to the
most likely demand forecasts, the third set of locks will yield a 12% internal rate of
return. Id. at 12. Canal traffic will not be interrupted during construction, however,
because the construction is outside existing operational areas. The plans for the
Canal's expansion project include several phases. The pre-construction phase includes
developing the final design, models and contracts. The first step in constructing the
locks includes dredging the channels. Building the new locks is scheduled to take
between five and six years, and includes dredging "both new lock access channels,
Gatun Lake navigational channels and sea entrances." Id. at 9.
285. Tolls will be set in a manner that will allow them to double within the next 20
years, to account for the cost of the expansion and to ensure it is profitable. In
addition, the third set of locks program will make growing contributions to the
National treasury because the Canal will continue to make these payments according
to the net tonnage of vessels transiting the Canal PANAmA CANAL.Au'rHoiur, supra
note 278, at 59.
286. PANAmA CANAI.AUmHORITY, supra note 278, at 61.
287. PANAmA CANAL Au'raoRrrv, supra note 278, at 65. According to the PCA's
economic plan, total proceeds from shipping transit tolls, after construction and
maintenance costs will be at least 1.72 billion each year for the next 20 years.
Gawrylewski, supra note 205.
288. Additionally, the PCA is a signatory of the United National Global Pact and is
a member of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. PAI.JmA
CANL AuTHORITY, supra note 278, at 49.
289. PANAm CMAi. AUTH-ORITY, supra note 278, at 48.
290. Gawrylewski, supra note 182.
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"No immitigable or permanent adverse impacts on the population
or the environment are anticipated" because it is believed that
adverse environmental consequences can be mitigated through
existing procedures and technology. 91 According to the Expansion
Proposal, the project will not cause permanent or irreversible
effects on water or air quality, and there are no "elements within
the scope of the project that will compromise its environmental
viability, including communities, primary forests, national parks
or forest reserves, relevant patrimonial or archaeological sites,
agricultural or industrial production areas, or tourist or port
areas.""' The project will generally be concentrated in areas
already encroached upon by other Canal projects, and included
within cost estimates are funds for reforestation and the restora-
tion of excavated materials."' 3 Finally, water supply requirements
will be satisfied by building water reutilization basins, deepening
the Gatun Lake's and Gaillard Cut's channels and elevating
Gatun Lake's maximum operational level; no new reservoirs are
required. 9 ' Thus, the PCA has gone to some lengths to ensure the
economic and environmental viability of the Canal's expansion.
This paper questions whether it has adequately considered its
new competition-the Arctic Ocean.
VI. POTENTIAL COMPETITION: A NORTHERN PASSAGE
As Panama increases the capacity of the Panama Canal, a
new route to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans may be
imminent. A passageway across the top of the Earth has long
been sought, but given an impenetrable ice cover over the top of
the planet much of the year, has long been denied. This frozen
obstacle, however, vanishes as a changing climate melts the Arctic
at an unprecedented rate; the global impact will be profound and
the consequences for Panama quite significant.
A. Climate Change and the Arctic Circle
The North Pole is actually part of an ocean that is covered,
depending upon the season, by varying amounts of ice."9 ' There is
291. PANAmA CANAL. AuTHOaRrY, supra note 278, at 48.
292. PAN~mA CANALu AUTHORITY, supra note 278, at 48-49.
293. PANm CANAL. AuTHORInr, supra note 278, at 54.
294. PAN'~A CANAL. AuTHORITY, supra note 278, at 53.
295. "The Arctic includes part or all of the territories of eight nations: Norway,
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Russia, and the United States as well
as the homelands of dozens of indigenous groups that encompass distinct sub-groups
9
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generally thicker ice in the winter and thinner ice in the summer.
The polar regions are sensitive to temperature variations and
thus profoundly affected by a warming climate;296 indeed, even a
degree of variation that exceeds the natural variability in the
earth's climate can be critical. 97 Thus, as global temperatures
increase, Arctic sea ice melts at an unparalleled rate. 9 ' Climatol-
ogists believe that swift escalation in Arctic thawing is due to
man-made global warming,299 predicting that Arctic ice cover may
disappear much sooner than initially envisaged.
The last few decades and especially the last few years have
been telling. Perennial ice,"' 0 the sea ice remaining after the sum-
and communities." ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF A WARMING
ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 6 (Cambridge University Press 2004).
296. MARUFU C. ZINYOWERA & ROBERT T. WATSON, THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY § 3.3 (Cambridge University
Press 1997). Temperatures in the Arctic have risen almost twice as fast as those for
the rest of the planet, and in the next century, temperatures may increase as much as
nine to thirteen degrees. See John Roach, Most Polar Bears Gone By 2050, Studies
Say, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Sept. 10, 2007, available at http://
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/09/070910-polar-bears.html (predicting that
the polar bear population is due for a rapid decline). One of the primary reasons the
Arctic warms faster than other habitats is because of its snow and ice cover, both of
which reflect sunlight. Snow and ice reflect up to 85% of sunlight, while water only
reflects 15% and absorbs the rest. As temperatures increase, additional ice and snow
melt. This loop is accelerating, as the Arctic loses more of its ability to reflect the
sun's energy back into the atmosphere. "In effect, warmth leads to more warmth."
Jonathan Leake, Arctic is Melting Even in Winter, TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 26, 2008, http://
www.timesonline .co.uk/tol/news/environment/article50l14744.ece (explaining the
heart of the melting in the Arctic is a simple science: ice is white, most of the sunlight
hitting it is reflected back into space, and when it melts it leaves open and darker
ocean that absorbs light and gets warmer, melting more ice and making it more
difficult for ice to form again in the winter).
297. Richard Black, Arctic Ice 'Disappearing Quickly,' BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4290340.stm.
298. NASA scientists have demonstrated that from 2004 to 2006, the Arctic's
usually permanent ice cover shrunk by 14% and Arctic ice melted four consecutive
years in a row: 2002-2006. This "Texas-sized" loss and longer melting periods have
been attributable to man-made global warming, and this human-induced melting
could result in even faster melting in future years. See Melissa McNamara, NASA:
Arctic Melt is 'Alarming,' CBS EVENING NEWS, Sept. 14, 2006, available at http:ll
www.cbsnews.comstories/2006/09/14/eveningnews/main20ll1009.shtml; Black, supra
note 297.
299. E.g., McNamara, supra note 298 (stating Arctic's ice loss is due to man-made
global warming); Black, supra note 296 (stating man-made global warming at least
partially to blame for Arctic ice melting).
300. This stands in the way of shipping through the Arctic. This ice used to cover
50-60% of the Arctic but has been rapidly decreasing. Furthermore, "very old ice that
remains in the Arctic for at least six years" comprised over 20% of the ice in the Arctic
in the 1980s, and has since decreased to 6%. Gretchen Cook-Anderson, Researchers
Say Arctic Sea Ice at Risk Despite Cold Winter, NASA FEATURE, Mar. 12, 2008, http:ll
www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/seaice conditions_feature.html.
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mer melt season, declined by approximately 193,000 square miles
each decade between 1970 and 2000,01 and since then, the rate of
decline has practically tripled. 02 With less perennial ice, thinner
seasonal ice predominates and thinner seasonal ice melts more
rapidly.303 Beginning in summer 2007, Arctic sea ice was at its
lowest recorded level since satellite measurements began in
1979.04 2008 began with NASA researchers announcing that per-
ennial sea ice was at an "all-time low." 0 ' Since perennial sea ice is
an "indicator of the long-term health" of Arctic ice, matters
seemed to be rather dire 0 ' as seasonal ice, some of which is less
than one-year old, appeared to be more dominant. With only a
four-foot thickness, such ice cover left the region more vulnerable
to winds and currents . 0 ' By the end of the 2009 Arctic summer,
some recovery was observed as the National Snow and Ice Data
Center ("NSDIC") reported more ice cover than during the record-
breaking summers of 2007 and 2008.0 Sea ice did not return to
previous levels, and the majority of Arctic ice cover is young, thin
and comprised of first and second-year ice, more prone to melting
during the summer. 09 Thus, despite "a little recovery," scientists
still expect ice-free summers in the next few decades. 10
301. Tabatha Thompson, NASA Exraminesq Arctic Sea Changes to Record Low in
2007, NASA MISSION NEWS, http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/lookingateartI
quikscat-20071001.html.
302. Between 2005 and 2007, perennial ice shrunk by an area the size of Texas and
California combined. Id.
303. This type of ice was more evident during the summer, but is now present year
round. Even summer ice was at a record low in 2002, after decreasing 9% per decade
between 1979 and 2002. See ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 294,
tbl. 997. "Sea-ice extent is very likely to continue to decrease, particularly in summer.
Model projections of summer sea-ice extent range from lots of several percent to
complete loss. As a result, the navigation season is projected to be extended by
several months." Id.
304. The Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, Melting
Arctic Circle Ice Drives Polar Bears Closer to Extinction, http:fl
globalwarming.house.gov/impactzones/arctic; National Snow and Ice Data Center,
Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http:ll
nsidc.org/news/Press/2007seaiceminimum2007001-pressrelease.html.
305. Mason Inman, Shrinking Arctic Sea Ice Thinner, More Vulnerable, NAT'L




308. The sea ice measured in September 2009 "was the third lowest since the start
of satellite records in 1979." National Snow and Ice Data Center, supra note 60.
309. National Snow and Ice Data Center, supra note 60.
310. According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center ("NSIDC"), September
2009 demonstrated an average ice area of 2.07 million square miles; this is 409,000
square miles greater than the record-setting low for 2007. However, the ice extent
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Over the course of the past 30 years, roughly 386,000 square
miles of Arctic sea ice, an area larger than Texas and Arizona
combined, have already melted."' 1 Recent research suggests that
summer Arctic sea ice could completely disappear as early as
2020.12 Sea ice is the key indicator and agent of heat and mois-
ture at the ocean surface, and ocean currents. Even if melting sea
ice does not directly affect sea levels, it will affect perennial ice,
which in turn changes sea levels .313 As the rate of sea ice decline
intensifies, the consequences for the Arctic region will be
profound.
B. Competing with the Panama Canal
As perennial ice has decreased by 41% over the last 23
years, 1 it has impacted the Arctic many ways, the most impor-
tant of which is on shipping and trade. 1 With rapidly decreasing
year-round ice, shipping and navigating through the Arctic may
become possible. 1 Some climatologists predict significant ice
cover for much of the 21st century, 1 while others conclude that "it
is probable that after the year 2050 the so-called Northwest Pas-
was still 649,000 square miles below the 1979 to 2000 September average. "Arctic sea
ice is now declining at a rate of 11.2 percent per decade, relative to the 1979 to 2000
average." National Snow and Ice Data Center, supra note 60.
311. National Snow and Ice Data Center, supra note 60.
312. National Snow and Ice Data Center, supra note 60; see also John Roach, supra
note 32. While recent scientific research illustrates a consensus that the Arctic will
be devoid of ice in future summers, opinions differ on exactly when this will occur.
Despite some disagreement over the exact timing, there is overwhelming consensus
on a declining sea ice cover, which is a burgeoning global problem, with 2005's record
setting lows providing the "exclamation point." NSIDC, Sea Ice Decline Intensiftes,
Sept. 28, 2005, available at http://nsidc.org/news/press/20050928-trendscontinue.
html (quoting Mark Serreze of NSIDC).
313. Cook-Anderson, supra note 300.
314. Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications
of Global Warming, FOREIGN AFFARmS ONmINE, Mar./Apr. 2008, http:/www.foreign
affairs.org/20080301faessay87206/scott-g-borgersonlarctic-meltdown.html.
315. Ice thickness and density, permafrost levels, hydrology, fisheries, terrestrial
systems, and human activities will be affected by temperature variability. See
generally ZireowERA. & WATSON, supra note 295.
316. While recent scientific research illustrates a consensus that the arctic will be
devoid of ice in future summers, opinions differ on exactly when this will occur.
Despite some disagreement over the exact timing, there is overwhelming consensus
on a declining sea ice cover that is a burgeoning global problem, with 2007's record
setting lows providing the "exclamation point." See Roach, supra note 32 (quoting
scientist Mark Serreze of the National Snow and Ice Data Center.
317. In 2005, a team of scientists from the U.S. Arctic Research Commission
presented an analysis on the possibility of navigation through the Arctic. The
scientists concluded that during the 21st century the central Arctic and its tangential
seas would still have "significant ice cover." GlobalSecurity.org, Panama Canal -
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sage to the north of Canada could be ice-free during the three
summer months and could be navigable to ships other than ice-
breakers during this short period.""'8 Panama has chosen to base
their expansion plans on the rosier scenario. However, given the
rapid pace of global warming, one must wonder.
The routes that currently compete with the Panama Canal
include the U.S. Intermodal System, the Suez Canal, the Cape of
Good Hope and Cape Horn."' 9 The proponents of the expansion
proposal recognized that there are additional routes that could
present competition. They list the Arctic as one such possibility,
but then write it off as a "hypothetical route 323" and conclude that
the Arctic route does not present true competition. 2 Perhaps the
proposal is correct and catastrophic melting will occur later rather
than sooner. Yet predictions have become increasingly dire as the
pace of melting accelerates and a Northwest Passage has tempo-




319. PAN~mvI. CANAL~1 AUTHORITY, supra note 277, at 19.
320. See id. at 22.
321. Id. at 25-26 ("it is not probable that carriers who offer liner services itineraries
between Northeast Asia and the U.S. East Coast, will divert services from the
Panama or the transpacific routes to the alleged Arctic route for two or three months
every year, especially when the route's navigability and availability will be
unpredictable, it will lack navigational aids, have little port connectivity and comprise
Canadian jurisdictional waters, particularly when we consider that itinerary operated
services are established in terms of route reliability, certainty and safety.").
322. The widely reported 2007 summer arctic ice shrinkage resulted in the opening
of the Northwest Passage, and according to British scientists lead by Dr. Katharine
Giles, such an opening is continuing in the winter months with the thickness of sea
ice decreasing 19% from the previous winter. Leake, supra note 296. According to
Giles, after the 2007 summer melting, the thickness of the winter ice nose-dived. Id.
Furthermore, winter air temperatures in 2007 were cold enough to sustain the ice,
and therefore may not have been the cause. Id. Instead, Giles suggests that the
Arctic is likely to melt much faster than previously thought, as a rise in water
temperature or change in ocean circulation could have "brought warmer water under
the ice." Id. Professor Peter Wadhams of Cambridge University concluded "the
Catlin Arctic Survey data supports the new consensus view - based on seasonable
variation of ice extent and thickness, changes in temperatures, winds and especially
ice composition - that the Arctic will be ice-free in summer within about 20 years, and
that much of the decrease will be happening within 10 years." Peter Griffiths, Arctic
to be Ice-Free in Summer in 20 Years: Scientist, REUTERS, Oct. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/~article/idUSTRE59E8W20091015. According to Wadhams,
the Arctic will essentially be treatable as an open sea in the summer. David
Shukman, Arctic to be "Ice-Free" in Summer, BBC NEWS, Oct. 12, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8307272.stm. The expedition suffered a
number of technical breakdowns that lead to the practice of hand-drilling through the
ice, and despite mechanical setbacks, the Catlin Survey provided information about
184 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:2
on the side of caution, especially when so much money is at stake.
It is a tough call and Panama, with its ambitious project to expand
a national treasure, may be the first test case.
VII. CONCLUSION
Panama is emblematic of many nations facing the uncertain
future of a warming climate. It stands at the threshold of com-
pleting its quest for modernization and the question is whether it
will be able to do so in a diametrically different manner than the
nations that preceded it in this pursuit. The answer to this ques-
tion, as it is for middle income nations generally, is imperative for
the entire international community. These nations did not cause
our planet's downward descent and they are not in a position to
stop it. But their collective impact is potentially enormous and
thus we must construct effective mechanisms to ensure that their
course is different-that is both cleaner and more efficient. How
those at the very bottom of the economic hierarchy fair in this pro-
cess is also essential if we are to do justice in this process. Thus
indigenous voices must be heard and these communities must not
be sacrificed in the name of climate change. This would be the
height of injustice for these peoples were not complicit in the prob-
lem, are more unlikely to reap any of the potential benefits yielded
by modernization, and should not bear the brunt of proffered
solutions.
Panama also demonstrates how singular the position of indi-
vidual nation states is bound to be. The Panama Canal, of course
is the height of distinction; vital canals are a rarity of the highest
order and found in very few countries. It is the center of Panama's
economy and its future and it is being affected by something that
is very unpredictable on the other side of the planet. It has no
control over this course of events even as these measures have a
potentially profound impact upon its plans, prospects and oppor-
tunities. While no other nation will face the exact same challenge,
there will certainly be challenges that are quite particular, and
likely to be unexpected and uncontrollable; it will undoubtedly
modify future prospects. Let us hope we can alter our current
the ice previously unavailable through satellites or submarines. Id. Professor Peter
Wadhams is the head of the Polar Ocean Physics Group at Cambridge University and
has been studying the Arctic ice since the 1960s-his most current expedition, the
Catlin Arctic Survey, took a survey route to the north of Canada. Id. Wadhams and
his team, lead by explorer Pen Hadow, expected to cross areas of multi-year ice that
are thicker and more resilient. Instead, the team found an average thickness of 4.8
meters. Id.
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destructive trajectory towards climatic catastrophe and find a way
to assist those who will feel its negative impact, whether it be
potentially more dire economic prospects, as in Panama, or the
loss of one's very home, as is facing the peoples of the Arctic
region.
